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A B S T R A C T )
D I S C I P L I N E  I N I R I S H  P O L I T I C A L  P A R T I E S  
S HANE MART I N
The level and nature of discipline in modern political parties remain two of 
the most fascinating aspects of politics. This study provides a review of the 
literature on the role of political parties and the perceived need for some form 
of collective action within parliament. A  survey of work on party discipline in 
other countries is also provided, followed by a closer examination of what is 
meant by ‘discipline’ . W e explore the level of cohesion and discipline in 
Irish parties. The organisation of Irish parties and the development of the 
whip system is examined along with other influences on the behaviour of 
TD s , such as the electoral system and Irish political culture. A  systematic 
account and analysis of cases of indiscipline between 1969 and 1997 is 
provided and analysed. The work concludes with a social-psychological 
explanation of T D s  behaviour which is tested using available empirical 
evidence and a laboratory experiment.
The thesis argues that the high levels of discipline among members of Irish 
parliamentary parties is best explained by reference to rational choice theories 
of political behaviour.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
The object o f this thesis is to present a detailed analysis o f discipline and 
indiscipline within parliamentary parties in the Republic o f Ireland . 1 It aims to 
test the accuracy o f the conventional wisdom that parties in Ireland are 
amongst the most disciplined in the world. The core objective is to develop an 
understanding o f the nature o f the control which parties have over their 
parliamentarians, the degree to which this control is required for party 
government and the extent to which parliamentarians are willing to accept 
such control.
A case study approach examines the occurrence o f rebellion against the 
party. A model is derived based on a rational choice approach to 
understanding behaviour. An examination o f the intra-party structures and 
environmental variables is undertaken to explain the high levels of 
conformity. This model is examined in a simulation that seeks to replicate the 
Irish political system and the costs and benefits associated with undisciplined 
behaviour.
1 The Oireachtas is composed of two chambers, the Dail and the Seanad. The body of this work 
concentrates on discipline of Dail Deputies. As O ’Halpin (1998b, p. 2) and Coakley (1993, p. 
135) notes the Seanad is subordinate to the Dail and enjoys few real independent powers. 
Cases of indiscipline among members of the Seanad are only utilised to make general points 
about rules of behaviour relevant to members of the Dail.
1
Given that this subject area is in its infancy this piece o f research is an 
exploratory analysis which has allowed me to identify a  number o f questions. 
The boundaries o f a masters thesis do not make it possible to provide answers 
or address fully all the issues that arise.
OUTLINE
This thesis is divided into five parts. Chapter one provides a review of the 
literature on party control o f parliamentarians in western democracies as well 
as an overview o f the importance o f the intra-party arena to modern 
democratic government. The question of why modern political parties subject 
members o f their parliamentary party to such control is also examined. The 
concepts and theories o f previous authors will be reviewed. The author also 
investigates the various mechanisms by which discipline is maintained in 
parties in other countries.
Chapter two examines the level o f cohesion and discipline in Irish political 
parties drawing on a roll-call analysis o f Dail divisions during 1996. The 
evidence clearly indicates that the level o f discipline is very high.
Chapter three examined the structure o f parliamentary parties in the Republic 
o f Ireland with reference to their influence over and control of 
parliamentarians. The organisational structure o f Irish parties and the
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parliamentary parties will be outlined, focusing on the role o f key actors such 
as the party leader, ministers and party whips
Chapter four provides a systematic account o f indiscipline in Irish parties in 
the latter half o f this decade. Using the cases, we seek to provide answers to 
questions such as who were the rebels and why did they rebel ?
Having explained cases o f indiscipline chapter five seeks to provide an 
analysis o f why parliamentarians are typically willing to accept official party 
policy. A number o f possible theories of behaviour will be assessed. The 
chapter develops a  formal model o f Irish legislative behaviour. Environmental 
influences on the behaviour o f deputies, such as candidate selection 
processes, are examined to see if  they provide an incentive for TDs to remain 
absolutely loyal to the party leadership.
Based on the rational choice model, a simulation is developed, which seeks to 
capture the essence o f the decision making process facing members of 
parliamentary parties when deciding how to vote in the legislative arena.
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CHAPTER ONE
POLITICAL PARTIES
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Political parties are extraordinary creatures. They remain pervasive and 
ubiquitous in all western political systems. Moreover they are the core feature 
o f democratic states - providing the principal link between the governed and 
governing. Yet, despite this, political parties are a much maligned 
phenomenon. The founding fathers o f the American political system went to 
great lengths to diminish the possibility o f the emergence o f parties, believing 
them to be synonymous with factions in society (Kelman, 1996). Edmund 
Burke was the first political philosopher to give political parties legitimacy 
and respectability, defining them as ‘a body o f men united, for promoting for 
their jo in t endeavours the national interest, upon some particular principle in 
which they all agree’ (Harmel & Janda, 1982, p. 74) . 1 Today in almost all 
liberal democratic states party government is the norm. Despite this most 
interest has focused on the party system as the predominant unit o f analysis. 
However as Eldersveld (1964, p. 1) has noted a party ‘is a miniature political 
system. It has an authority structure ..., it has a representative process, an
1 The different views can be better understood when we recall M adison’s definition of a faction 
and party as ‘a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, 
who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the 
rights o f other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.’ 
(Madison, 1787, p. 54)
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electoral system, and subprocesses for recruiting leaders, defining goals, and 
resolving internal system conflict.’ Fundamental to any study o f the internal 
working o f political parties must be the issue o f internal discipline, in terms 
o f the degree to which it exists, how it is achieved and its consequences for 
wider issues such as democracy and effective government.
1.2 THE CONCEPT OF PARTY
B urkes’ definition captures one o f the key elements o f a party by recognising 
that some unity o f purpose must exist between the people who form the 
organisation. Parties emerged as a means for managing the huge number o f 
conflicting demands that have grown from the increasing complexity of 
society and its governance since the early nineteenth century. As the 
autocratic power structure collapsed in Europe and the suffrage was extended 
some institutional organisation was needed to provide the people with an 
acceptable and feasible choice between different policies.
Representative democracy first emerged in most western countries nearly a 
century and a half ago, and has as its basis the principle that power was 
placed in the hands o f a representative assembly, modelled to a greater or 
lesser degree on the assembly system o f ancient Athenian democracy 
(Arblaster, 1987). Modern political systems in the western world differ from 
their Athenian counterpart because they are representative rather than direct.
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As W orre (1996, p. 2) notes, ‘political developments changed the realities o f 
the representative system. ’ Political parties developed, sometimes outside and 
occasionally inside parliament, and their creation marked the end o f the 
individual representative. Parties were seen as the instrument where 
conflicting interests could be channelled and collated and providing an 
instrument with which respon sib le  govern m en t could be established. Parties 
evolved from the primeval slime o f individualism into actors in their own 
right with their members accepting the principle o f collective action. Today 
the plurality o f interests in society makes representation and effective decision 
making impossible without political parties who are able to organise those 
conflicting interests.
The development and contemporary nature o f parties vary greatly between 
countries. In North America national political parties are very weak coalitions 
of individual politicians who in effect unite only once every four years to 
battle in a presidential election campaign, and even then the campaign is 
more candidate-centred than party-centred. This traditional thesis that 
American parties are weak has been challenged in recent years. Coleman 
(1996, p. 368) for example notes that
the past decade has seen a sea change among scholars 
regarding the health o f party organizations in the United 
States. W here fifteen years ago there was consensus that 
party organization was weak, today the consensus argues
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that party organizations are revitalized, resurgent, and 
relevant.
In western European countries on the other hand there has never been any 
doubt about the central role o f political parties in politics. Almost all 
parliamentary systems experience relatively disciplined, programmatic parties. 
The essence of a executive-parliamentary system o f government relies on the 
parliament supporting the actions o f the executive - if  the executive loses the 
support o f a majority o f the parliament, it must resign. Consequently being 
guaranteed the support o f a majority o f parliamentarians is crucial to stable 
government.
1.3 MEASURING DISCIPLINE
An assumption o f any analysis o f the explanations o f discipline must be that 
parties are well-disciplined creatures. W hile a casual observation may 
indicate that they are, some valid mechanisms are needed to calibrate 
discipline. Researchers in other countries have employed two mechanisms to 
measure this scientifically: roll-call and re-election.
roll-call analysis
2 The exact constitutional requirements vary from country to country. In Germany for example 
the constnictive vote of no confidence requires that the parliament cannot break a government 
unless they make a new one.
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The defining feature o f parliamentary government in most western European 
countries is that the government in office depends on the support of 
parliament for its legislative programme and its continued survival. It ensures 
this support by requiring deputies who are affiliated to the governing parties 
to vote as they are instructed by the government. Likewise in trying to 
frustrate the Government, opposition parties will depend on their M Ps to vote 
as they are instructed.
As voting in parliamentary divisions is so important an analysis o f the voting 
behaviour o f individual MPs who are members o f political parties can give an 
indication o f whether or not parties are indeed cohesive and well-disciplined 
organisations. This analysis is assisted by the fact than in most parliaments the 
practice is for the votes o f individual MPs to be recorded. W ere this not the 
case and a procedure such as a show of hands or private voting were the 
mechanisms o f voting then no analysis o f the voting behaviour o f individual 
MPs could be undertaken .
One o f the simplest techniques to study voting behaviour is that used by the 
US journal C on gression a l Q u arterly  to examine the cohesion o f voting in 
Congress. A ‘party unity score’ is computed expressing ‘the percentage of 
times that a member votes in agreement with a majority o f his party, on votes 
that split the parties, when a majority o f voting Democrats oppose a majority
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of voting Republicans’. A figure for the overall cohesion o f  each party can 
then be computed as the average o f the mean scores for each member o f that 
particular party.
The index lies between 1.00 and .00 where 1 indicates a  completely cohesive 
party (members always vote with a majority o f their party, the majority always 
equalling 100%) and 0 where only 50 percent o f the time a member will vote 
with the majority o f his party. If  a parliamentarian voted randomly then he 
would be expected to vote with his party 50 percent of the time.
A similar method is used to calculate the ‘Rice index o f cohesion’ (Rice, 
1928). The Rice index o f cohesion is calculated as the proportion o f the group 
comprising the group majority on a roll call less the proportion comprising 
the group minority. The Rice index lies between 100 and zero. Thus in a 
group of 1 0 0  where ( 1 0 0 - 0  that is everyone in a party votes the same way we 
have an index number o f 1 0 0  ( 1 0 0 -0 ) and where exactly half the party vote 
one way and the other half vote another way we have a index number o f 0 
(50-50).
These technique are problematic because they fail to account for those who 
do not vote (those who abstain or those who are not present in the chamber 
for a vote). This seems to be a major problem because an alternative to voting
3 The Italian Chamber of Deputies is an example of a national parliament where voting can be 
conducted in secret. As Sassoon (1997, p. 200) notes the ‘members of the Italian assemblies
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against the party is simply a refusal to vote for the party. This as we will see 
in later chapters is possibly a more common form o f indiscipline.
The ‘index o f agreement’ attempts to take into account the importance of 
unsanctioned abstentions (where a party expected a member to vote but they 
did not). Attina (1990, p. 564) describes the index as ‘a measure o f the 
relation that exists between the three modalities o f votes - in favour, against 
and abstention’. More specifically the index is computed as the percentage 
difference between ( 1 ) the highest numbering modality and the sum of the 
other two modalities in a vote by members o f the party and (2 ) the total 
number o f votes cast by the group.
The index o f agreement is equal to 100 when all members o f the 
parliamentary party vote in the same way. Between this and zero the level of 
internal cohesion decreases, but more than half the members o f each party 
express the same modality (for, against, abstain). At zero we have a two-way 
split o f the votes in two modalities (half the party vote for or else vote against 
or abstain) or a combination o f any two modalities represent just half the 
votes o f those voting (for example half the party either abstain or vote no and 
the other half vote yes). A negative figure, which arises where the votes break 
down into three modalities and even the highest number o f votes in one 
modality is less than half o f the total votes o f party members, indicating an 
even higher level o f undisciplined voting.
can use a secret ballot and can thus escape party discipline’.
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An alternative to using the index o f agreement to take account o f  unexcused 
abstentions is to multiply the ordinary index o f cohesion or Rice index by an
index of participation.
The index o f participation captures the proportion of those MPs who were 
required to participate by their party and who actually did. It is easy to obtain 
an index o f participation where the list o f excused absentees is known to the 
analyst. The index itself is calculated by the following formula:
1 - a/s
where
• a = the number o f members voting
• s = the number o f members who should be present in the house according 
to the list o f excused absences.
The index of participation ranges between 1 (where all members required to 
vote do so) and 0  (where no member o f the party who is required to vote do 
so). The index is o f itself a useful measure o f discipline as it tells us 
something about the success o f the parties in getting their members to attend 
for votes. However it is most useful when multiplied by any o f the other non- 
participatory measures o f cohesion.
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W hat links each o f the above methods o f measuring party discipline is their 
focus on the voting behaviour o f members in parliament. W hile each method 
has its own unique methodological problems one important factor allows for 
their employment; votes by individual members o f parliament are recorded. A 
contrary system (and one still used in theory in some countries) is for the chair 
or speaker to put the motion to the floor o f the parliament and seek an oral 
response from members.
re-selection
W riting about Spanish parliamentary parties, Sanchez De Dios (1995) uses an 
entirely different means to measure discipline. This measure is based on an 
examination o f the rate o f turnover o f MPs in the Spanish national parliament 
- the C on greso  de los D ipu tados. The justification for adopting this method is 
twofold: firstly, because individual MPs are unable to offer dissent in voting 
in the parliament t5eTrau$£ under the rules o f the parliament the parliamentary 
group leader casts a vote on behalf o f the members o f the group |a roll-call 
analysis is not possible. Secondly, the system of electing MPs is based on 
voting for a party list with the party deciding the composition o f the list. Thus 
the selection and re-selection of candidates is entirely at the discretion o f the 
party elite. The argument here is that one o f the few reasons why a sitting MP 
would fail to get re-selected and be placed towards the top of the party list 
and thus stand an almost certain probability o f getting re-elected is if  the 
M P’s behaviour is not acceptable to the party elite. This method o f analysis is
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of course dependent on the party elite having control o f the candidate 
selection process. W here this is not the case, no inference could be made 
between turnover o f MPs and the level o f discipline.
The potential certainly exists for such causal relationships to be made in many 
western European countries because the party (at some level) usually has 
control over who their candidates are. W hen a sitting M P’s behaviour is 
undisciplined, the party may de-select him or her. The number o f de­
selections is then used as a measure o f the level o f discipline. However we 
must be careful to recognise that de-selection could occur for entirely 
different reasons not in any way related to the undisciplined behaviour of the 
sitting MP. A more serious methodological problem with the application of 
this procedure is that even when an MP acts in a undisciplined way he or she 
may still be re-selected by the party as a candidate.
1.4 EXPLAINING DISCIPLINE
Politicians are generally intelligent and well-educated people, wishing to 
exercise influence, with beliefs, preferences and tastes o f their own. Yet it 
seems that frequently they surrender their will on all issues when they 
become or seek to become members o f parliament. The behaviour o f  British 
MPs has been likened to that o f a flock o f sheep being herded through a gap 
by a farmer with a large stick. It has been questioned if it would not be more
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economical to hire sheep to be driven through the division lobbies o f western 
European parliaments rather than pay parliamentarians (Ingle, 1995).4 How 
then can this willingness to conform to party requirements be explained ?
One explanation o f why parliamentarians are predisposed to follow the party 
line is that they agree with the party policy because they are like-minded 
individuals. Typically the party system is based on ideological cleavages and 
consequently we could expect members o f the same party to be closer to each 
other on policy issues than to members o f a different party. Therefore where a 
policy divides parties in a parliament, as we would expect it would in an 
adversarial system, members o f each party will be in agreement with each 
other.
Kirkpatrick and McLemore (1977) are amongst the strongest proponents of 
this explanation. They term this agreement as being akin to ‘personal 
directives from w ithin’ (Kirpatrick & McLemore, 1977, p.6 8 6 ). However this 
explanation is not self-sustaining when one considers the myriad o f issues 
that parliamentarians are required to express an opinion on. Even in a 
multiparty system where parties can reflect multidimensional ideological 
beliefs, it is hard to imagine that enough parties could exist to meet the exact 
ideological belief o f each member o f parliament on every single issue of
4 Following the election to government of the British Labour Party the leadership decided to 
find alternative tasks for backbenchers. As The Independent (24 June 1997) reports ‘Labour’s 
army of 330 backbenchers is to be put to work out in the country as the eyes and ears of the
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which they are required to give an opinion. W hat is more in a two party 
system on occasions the ideological divisions are even less likely to 
correspond with personal preferences o f members.
Take for example the issue o f European integration and the previous British 
parliament (the second Major government). The core divisions within British 
politics on European policy is not inter-party in nature (that is between the 
parties) but intra-party (within parties). Thus where policy decisions cut 
across ideology as defined by the party system, we cannot say that the 
disciplined nature o f parliamentary parties results from the fact that members 
o f each party share exactly the same opinions on all issues.
Another explanation is based on the fact that while not all members o f the 
same party will agree with each other all o f the time they generally do and 
when they don’t they will nevertheless, out o f a sense o f duty to collective 
action, accept the majority view o f their party. Crowe (1986) refers to this 
explanation as ‘internal identification.’ He refers to cases where a positive 
relationship exists between particular parliamentarians. Certainly it is often 
assumed that particular parliamentarians, even though they disagree with a 
specific policy, will nevertheless go along with it out o f  a sense o f  obligation 
to the party. Here an MP will behave in a disciplined way not because he 
agrees with the stance his party is taking but because he acknowledges the
Government. In a move designed to prevent dissent born of boredom, the Government is 
pfenning a “revolution” in the way its MPs work.
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principle o f party loyalty. Surprisingly this view has remained underdeveloped 
as an explanation for party discipline.
hope o f future promotion
As Epstein (1956, p. 361) points out ‘the position [in insuring discipline] 
particularly o f the party leader is strong because he is either prime minister or 
a potential prime minister and as such he bestows the ministerial offices 
without which an ambitious M P’s career is a failure, financially and 
politically’. O f course leaders o f smaller parties share the same power 
because the allocation o f ministerial portfolios which the party may be 
allocated if they are in government is decided not by the leader o f the 
government but the leader o f each party. Thus if an MP wants to ever become 
a member o f the government or frontbench he must have a clean sheet in that 
his or her record o f support for the party must usually be absolute. In the 
United Kingdom the prime minister will normally consult with the 
Government chief whip before making appointments to any position within 
the government from parliamentary private secretary to cabinet minister. 
Many parliamentarians however realise that they stand little chance o f ever 
becoming part o f the government and some are happy to remain as 
backbenchers for as long as they are in parliament. Clearly for these the 
possibility o f being rejected for a ministerial career if they do not show loyalty 
is not a very powerful enforcement mechanism.
potential patronage
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A government or potential government do however have other prizes to tempt 
their members to behave correctly. The European Parliament, where 
parliamentarians have no possibility o f  entering a European government, is a 
good example o f where leaders o f party groups use other means to entice 
their members to cooperate, which usually requires that M EPs simply turning 
up or on occasions to vote with the group. Raunio (1996b, p. 9) reports that 
‘individuals who constantly dissent from the group line can expect not to 
receive nominations o f their choice within the chamber.’ The potential o f 
patronage as a tool o f discipline is o f course very much dependent on who 
normally allocates such benefits and on whether or not individual 
parliamentarians are concerned with gaining promotion. Another study o f the 
European Parliament (Corbett et. al., 1995) has shown that members are not 
heavily influenced by the possibility o f being appointed as key rapporteurs, or 
to other political positions within the parliament. Consequently other 
mechanisms have to be used to ensure some degree of group cohesion. In 
national parliaments, where the consequences o f voting in a particular way 
may be greater than in the European Parliament, it is more difficult to 
influence parliamentarians with the offer o f committeeship. This is especially 
true when w e consider the weakness o f committee systems in most national 
parliaments.
expulsion
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If  all else fails it is usual that the party leadership will threaten to expel from 
the parliamentary party or even from ordinary party membership an MP who
votes against the party. In addition MPs who receive this punishment may 
lose a number o f privileges such as party research assistance, the help o f the 
party press office and a range o f other benefits accruing from membership of 
the parliamentary party. Members who are expelled from the party lose the 
right to run as a party candidate or be associated in any way with the official 
party. In some countries (such as Ireland) party rules impose automatic 
expulsion from the parliamentary party if a member fails to vote with the 
party or even fails to turn up for a key vote. In other countries expulsion is at 
the discretion o f the party leader. However as Jackson (1968) has pointed out 
many party leaders are loath to dismiss a British MP from the parliamentary 
party because once dismissed they are not required to support their party 
although their voting behaviour would probably be the basis for deciding on 
their eventual return to the parliamentary party. This concern is greater where 
disciplined voting is imperative, for example in parliaments with a wafer-thin 
government majority.
deselection
Perhaps the greatest compliance mechanism can be the threat by the party to 
refuse to re-select the member as the official party candidate at the next 
general election. The aim o f most members o f parliament is to get re-elected 
at the next election. If  failure to gain re-selection reduces one’s ability to get
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re-elected, there is a clear need on the part o f sitting M P s to do whatever is 
required to gain re-selection. O f course candidate selection processes vary 
across countries, from being highly centralised (with the party leadership 
choosing candidates) to heavily decentralised selection mechanisms (with 
party members, or as in America the voting public, choosing the candidates). 
W here re-selection is at the discretion o f the party leadership one would 
expect that MPs would have greater need to be loyal. However Thiebault 
(1988) points out that in the larger French parties the centralisation o f the 
selection process has not increased the level o f discipline despite the fact that 
repeated infringement may result in members having diminished chance of 
being re-selected.
In addition to those mechanisms listed above, an even more powerful one at 
the disposal o f a Prime Minister is the threat to dissolve Parliament if  his or 
her own backbenchers fail to provide the necessary support for the 
government’s legislative programme to succeed. This o f course depends on 
the constitutional power o f the executive to do so - in Israel, for example, the 
prime minister has no power to dissolve the Knesset. An example o f the use 
o f such a mechanism was the attempt of the second M ajor Government in the 
United Kingdom to ratify the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in the 
House o f Commons in 1993. The government was initially defeated on the 
bill when a number o f their own backbenchers who were sceptical about the 
treaty defied the party whip. The Prime Minister immediately informed the
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House o f Commons that the bill would become a matter o f  confidence in his 
government and would therefore be voted upon again with the clear 
constitutional implication that if  the bill was again defeated the government 
would have no option but to resign. The Prime M inister’s brinkmanship-like 
strategy was successful and a number o f those Conservative MPs who 
originally voted against the government voted with the party on the second 
occasion. While it was common to use this tactic in the nineteenth century 
Epstein (1956) notes that its use as a mechanism to compel cohesive voting 
within government parties has been very rarely used throughout this century.
1.5 COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF INDISCIPLINE
A number o f pioneering studies have sought to examine the level and reasons 
for discipline in specific countries or parliaments.
Franklin et. al. (1986) have sought to explain the apparent decline in party 
cohesion in divisions in the British House of Commons by undertaking an 
analysis o f those MPs who defied the whip during the early 1970s. They test 
three hypotheses : The first, termed the ‘new breed hypothesis’, suggests that 
discipline is on the decline because new members o f parliament are more 
professional and therefore less willing to adhere to party policy. A regression 
analysis is run to test the relationship between rebelliousness and ‘newness’ 
(the length the MP has served in the Commons) and from this the authors
2 0
conclude that no significance can be attached; members who rebel are not 
necessarily younger or likely to have been elected for the first time more 
recently.
The second hypothesis; that poor leadership in the Conservative party was the 
cause o f rebelliousness and centred around a identifiable right-wing faction, 
was tested with an examination o f the breakdown o f dissent between the two 
main parties, Labour and Conservative. The conclusions reached disprove the 
hypothesis as the evidence showed that indiscipline was as likely within the 
Labour Party as within the Conservative party. The fact that within each party 
dissent is highest among members with leading committee roles, who are 
drawn from representative cross-sections of each party rather than one wing, 
suggests that dissent is not based on particular factions within particular 
parties.
The third hypothesis relates to the issue o f the decline o f the ‘parliamentary 
rule’ which ensured that a government who lost any Commons division 
would have to resign. This was put forward as a reason for increased 
undisciplined voting by Labour backbenchers. However the authors reject the 
argument because no difference could be seen between behaviour o f Labour 
and Conservative members either in or out o f government.
In rejecting all three hypotheses the authors conclude that (p 156)
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whatever the source o f this period effect, our analysis makes 
it appear unlikely to have a simple one. If  the effect was felt 
as widely as we have documented it to have been, then the 
chances are good that its roots lie in a multitude o f factors
Cox and M cCubbins (1991) seek to test the conventional wisdom that the 
importance o f party in the US Congress has been in decline since the turn o f 
the century. This is most clearly seen by the decline in adversarial voting 
along party lines, and where adversarial voting actually took place by the 
decline in inter-party cohesion. Based on a roll-call analysis they argue that 
party cohesion has not declined dramatically. For example between 1933-46 
the majority party leadership won, on average, 75 per cent o f the time. The 
equivalent figure for the period 1979-88 was actually higher at 81 percent, 
suggesting an increase in party cohesion.
Raunio (1996b) undertakes an analysis o f voting behaviour o f the members of 
the European Parliament in votes taken on a roll-call. W hile the results show 
that, in general, group cohesion is quite strong, interesting differences emerge 
between groups. For example the score o f the Left Unity Group at .938 was 
much higher than that o f the European Democratic Alliance. The differences 
in the levels o f cohesion is explained in terms of the level o f homogeneity 
within each group. Another study o f M EPs by Attina (1990) suggests that the 
nature o f the vote (initiative or control function) can often predict the level of 
cohesion with initiatives producing greater party cohesion because they can
22
serve to promote and legitimise at the European level the interests that the 
MEPs claim to represent.
Sanchez De Dios (1995) concludes that dissent in voting in the Spanish 
parliament has not been significant. Indeed in a study o f voting behaviour on 
568 bills, the average vote was 223 in favour, 28 against and 14 abstentions. 
W hile the average level o f abstentions may be considered an indication of 
incohesion it is noted that in reality it is difficult to associate abstentionism 
with dissent in Spain. The author concludes that the principle o f free mandate 
o f MPs enshrined in the 1978 constitution is ineffective in reality.
W orre (1996) suggests that the cause o f cohesion within Danish political 
parties arises from the structure of the parliament. Like their counterparts in 
Spain, Danish parliamentarians cannot take any initiatives, such as 
introducing private members bills, without the consent o f  their party. They are 
‘party representatives in parliamentary affairs’ (Worre, 1996, p. 11).
Harmel and Janda (1982) have undertaken a comparative analysis o f voting 
cohesion in 67 parties in 21 countries throughout the world. They also test for 
the relationship between what they term ‘environmental variables’ and party 
cohesion. Their results are reproduced in table 1.1. The propositions which 
they measure are as follows:
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1. The structure o f the relationship between the executive and the legislature 
has an important effect on party cohesion. W here the executive originates 
from, and is dependent on the support o f the legislature then we could 
expect cohesion to be higher.
Where the structure o f the state is unitary rather than federal party cohesion 
will be higher. Thus for example we would expect party cohesion to be 
lower in America and Germany than in the United Kingdom other things 
being equal.
2. A multiparty system is likely to have more highly disciplined parties 
because each party will be more homogeneous than if only two parties 
existed.
3. W here society is polarised along class lines then we could expect parties to 
be more disciplined. The greater the distance between parties along the 
ideological continuum, the greater the polarisation and thus the greater the 
cohesion within each party.
4. Parliamentarians elected from single-member constituencies rather than 
multi-member ones will be less disciplined in their voting behaviour
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The more effective and powerful the legislature the less cohesive will be the
parties.
TABLE 1.1 EXPLAINING DISCIPLINE
Environmental Factor Simple Explained
Correlation Variance
r r2
Presidential system -.53* .28
Federalism .05 .0 0
Number o f parties .0 0 .0 0
Ideological polarisation -.04 .0 0
Single-member districts - . 1 1 0 1
Legislative effectiveness .26* .07
* indicates the result are significant at the .05
level
Source: Harmel and Janda (1982, p. 8 6 )
The analysis o f the environmental factors with the level o f discipline in 
parties in each country show no correlation between the structure o f the state, 
the number o f parties, ideological polarisation around class, the district 
magnitude and the level o f discipline. The presidential system of government 
is negatively correlated with party discipline and a positive correlation is 
shown to exist between legislative effectiveness and party cohesion as 
expected.
In an earlier study Epstein (1980, p. 321) reached similar conclusion - that 
the low level o f cohesion in American political parties is best explained by 
reference to the separation o f powers. W here the survival or even 
effectiveness and efficiency o f the government is not dependent upon a party
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in the legislative arena then there is less incentive and need for 
parliamentarians to act cohesively
Two o f the leading scholars on British political parties have examined the 
attitude o f local party members to the issue o f discipline within the 
Conservative parliamentary party (Whiteley & Seyd, 1997). Based on results 
from a wide ranging survey they conclude that more staunch members attach 
great importance to their M P’s loyalty to the centre party. On the other hand 
members who value decentralisation in the party organisation are more 
concerned with their MP serving the needs o f constituents. In the same study 
the authors (p. 2 0 ) conclude that
in the light o f this discussion it appears that appeals to the 
grassroots by the parliamentary leadership for help in 
disciplining rebellious backbenchers are increasingly quiet 
likely to fall on deaf ears ... an MP who gratifies local 
sensibilities, and who does a  reasonable amount o f 
constituency service, can persistently rebel in the House of 
Commons, without being unduly concerned that this will 
lead to his or her deselection.
The issue o f whether parties throughout the world are becoming less 
disciplined is an interesting one which requires further study. In the small 
number o f countries surveyed by the author only one researcher noted that 
parties in his country seemed to be becoming more disciplined. Using data
26
from a roll-call analysis Rasch (1997) concludes that for parties in the 
Norwegian parliament discipline has increased rather than decreased in recent
years
Searing (1995) in constructing a social psychological explanation o f 
discipline is one o f the first to attempt an abstract model o f the topic. 
Although setting out to use a combination o f rational choice and normative 
theories the result o f the research seems to draw heavily on the latter with 
little mention o f rationality or preference maximising politicians. Based on 
interviews with members o f the British House of Commons Searing provides 
little new explanation o f substance while concluding that
political authority is the principle alternative to coercive 
power. Each pursues compliance; but the results they 
achieve, and the way they go about it, are different. 
Authority seeks voluntary compliance through rational 
persuasion and gentle manipulation and is therefore the 
more efficient and less unpleasant strategy. Power, by 
contrast, expects little more than grudging obedience and is 
content to live with the resentments o f those it compels to 
act against their wishes. (Searing, 1995, p. 695)
1.6 DEMOCRACY AND DISCIPLINE
P arliam en tary G overnm en t
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Government in most developed countries is party government - the executive 
is formed from and with the support o f parliamentarians who have allied 
themselves with certain parties prior to election. As long as a party has a 
majority o f parliamentary seats, the role o f the parliament seems only 
theoretical. In systems o f parliamentary government (most countries 
excluding the United States, France and more recently Israel) the ability of 
parliamentarians to act independent o f any pressure would seem to be the 
only basis of democracy.
Many have lamented the passing o f the golden age o f parliamentary power, 
most closely associated with the British House o f Commons in the nineteenth 
century. In this era, in so much as it actually existed, the executive were truly 
responsible to and dependent upon the support o f the House. Today we have 
the same dilemma as political scientists talk about the weakness of 
parliaments and their declining role. It is claimed that the classical role 
assigned to parliaments is farcical when one recognises the seminal role of 
the modern political party. Let us examine each of these roles in turn to see if 
the concerns are legitimate.
• APPOINTING A GOVERNMENT: In parliamentary systems the people 
vote in an election for individual politicians who then go to parliament and 
support the appointment o f a government. Likewise a government will fall if 
it no longer has the support o f a majority o f the parliament. Clearly the role of
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parliamentarians in this regard is fundamental. However when we introduce 
party into the equation we quickly realise that the surprise is eliminated from 
the process - where a party secures a majority o f seats it is easy to predict that 
that party will form the government, the party leader will be prime minister 
and the government will not fall until a participating party wants it to.
• M AXING POLICY: The central feature o f a parliament is that it has the 
sole authority to make law. But again this rather grand power fails to 
recognise the role o f party. As Gallagher et. al. (1995, p. 43) have noted:
European governments are not always keen to allow 
parliaments a real role in making laws, feeling that 
parliaments should confine themselves to discussing and 
ultimately approving what the government proposes ... a 
government will usually expect to be able to rely on party 
discipline to push its program through the legislature.
Consequently a handful o f politicians, almost always centred around the 
cabinet, control the whole policy-making process. The role o f parliament is 
simply to accept as a f a i t  accom pli the decision o f the cabinet and 
government.
This point was most clearly seen when the Irish government were defeated in 
the Dail on a bill to introduce a light rail system for Dublin. The upset came 
as a shock to everyone as the following exchanges between a government
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deputy (Noonan) and an opposition deputy (Andrews) during debate in the 
chamber testifies:
Noonan: This is a pyrrhic victory - the Opposition did not expect to
win
Andrew s: O f course we did not expect to win; the Government 
would have been expected to win 
(Dail Debates 11 June 1996, col. 1693)
Indeed the contempt for the role o f parliament was most clearly shown when 
the Government re-introduced the same bill within a few weeks - much to the 
annoyance o f the opposition parties.
• OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT: The expectation here is that 
parliamentarians will act as hawks, ensuring that the government will act 
correctly and properly at all times. The nature o f discipline in parties seem to 
rule out the possibility o f deputies openly taking issue with a minister when 
the party is in government. Likewise opposition parties do not look with 
favour upon their own deputies criticising their party frontbenchers. In these 
circumstances oversight becomes an domain o f shadow cabinets rather than 
o f individual parliamentarians no matter how engaged the backbencher is in a 
particular topic.
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Sartori (1997, p. 190) shares the view o f many social scientists and 
commentators when he claims that
the call for party discipline has an unpleasant ring to it.
Many tears are shed over the dire fate o f the back-bencher, 
o f the parliamentary peons or water-bearers; and much 
invective is pronounced against the rubber-stamp MP. I 
sympathise, for I would not myself like any o f that. Yet the 
fact is and remains that a parliamentary government cannot 
govern without parliamentary support; that support means 
that the parties that uphold a government can actually deliver 
the vote o f their MPs; and that means, in turn, the capacity to 
impose uniform voting.
The comments by Sartori are important because they highlight the real 
dilemma for constitutionalists - how to ensure the presence o f necessary 
discipline to allow for effective party government while ensuring a 
democratic role o f individual elected parliamentarians.
The answer seems two-fold. First governments are responsible to the wishes 
o f the majority o f parliament and no one, not even a whip, can stop a member 
o f parliament from withdrawing support for their party
USURPING THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT ?
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Secondly parliamentary party politics is realpolitic. The head o f the executive 
is the head o f the party and depends on the members o f the party for 
continued support. If the leader does not act according to the wishes o f the 
party he or she will more than likely see themselves out o f office - not 
because o f a vote o f no confidence in parliament but a vote o f no confidence 
and a subsequent leadership selection within the parliamentary party.
The fall from power o f Margaret Thatcher is a case in point. Her style of 
politics was to be chief o f the cabinet making decisions from her office for all 
o f the government departments and without recourse to the wishes o f the 
people. Yet the lady dubbed by many as the untouchable was forced to resign 
as party leader and prime minister because her policies (particularly it would 
seem on the issue o f further European integration and the poll-tax) and 
leadership style were no longer acceptable to the governing conservative 
party. As Onslow (1997, p. 1) has written:
In 1990 it seemed Margaret Thatcher had committed the 
cardinal error o f assuming that her supremacy in Cabinet 
was ‘the bottom line’, forgetting that she was ultimately 
answerable to the party in the House o f Commons. .. 
certainly, the initiative and ultimate policy-making decisions 
do rest with the leadership. But these decisions have to 
reflect the pulse o f opinion within the Tory ranks; otherwise, 
dissent ferments to the point o f open criticism and erodes the 
leadership’s ability to carry the party forward.
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Consequently in systems with highly disciplined parties we should not rush to 
criticise the lack o f power o f ordinary parliamentarians. W hile a government 
with a large majority o f seats may feel able to take parliament for granted the 
political elite must be aware o f the dangers o f causing major annoyance and 
trouble to their own backbenchers. To use the terminology o f Rose (1986), 
while most parliamentarians are unwilling to bite they are more than willing 
to bark.
And barking may be enough to cause major embarrassment and a change of 
policy on the part o f a government. Having members on the same side o f the 
House oppose and in some cases openly castigate the policy or performance 
o f ministers probably causes more damage than the collective ability of 
opposition parties. As one leading political commentator has recently written:
that’s the dilemma for the whips: by taking disciplinary 
action they risk making them (the rebels) martyrs who have 
nothing to loose by maximum publicity .5
Thus while some, such as Blondel (1995) see parliamentarians in a 
disciplined party (and by extension the parliament o f which they are 
members) as having little or no effective power we should not completely 
discount their role as being merely symbolic rubber-stamping. Referring to 
the British House o f Commons, Rose (1986, p. 15) for example argues that
5 Donald MacIntyre writing in The Independent, 25 June 1997
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backbench MPs are weak but not completely impotent.
Because the expectation of party loyalty is so strong, any 
deviation there form appears disproportionately important: 
abstention or a vote against the government by half a dozen 
or by a dozen MPs in the governing party can make headline 
news, and backbenchers can sometimes use the threat o f 
public rebellion to secure ministerial modification of a 
policy.
1.7 SUMMARY
Political Parties are now a central aspect of most if  not all competitive 
political systems. O f central concern to scholars of parties and party systems 
must be intra-party politics - the politics within parties and how this impacts 
on the role o f parties in the wider political system. This chapter has reviewed 
works by a number of scholars interested in the phenomena o f control and 
discipline in parliamentary parties.
The occurrence o f discipline is most clearly demonstrated by reference to 
voting behaviour o f politicians in parliamentary assemblies. This has given 
rise to formal statistical analysis o f voting records in an attempt to compose 
indexes o f cohesion which measure the level of discipline within political 
parties. Many authors have also attempted to explain discipline. In general 
this has usually been done with either reference to the hierarchical structure of
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party organisation or by seeking to comprehend the motivation o f individual 
parliamentarians.
O f equal concern must be the consequences o f discipline, both for intra-party 
democracy and consequently the democratic foundations o f the whole 
political system. The existence o f parliamentary sovereignty, with the 
implication o f equal but collective sovereignty for members, must be 
questioned when parties exert so much control on the behaviour o f their 
parliamentarians.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
M E A S U R I N G  D I S C I P L I N E  I N  
I R I S H  P O L I T I C A L  P A R T I E S
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to explore the conventional wisdom that members o f Irish 
parliamentary parties are highly disciplined. This investigation is prefaced by 
a discussion o f what constitutes discipline and how this term differs from the 
closely associated idea o f cohesion in political parties. Having identified 
discipline as a distinct phenomenon we turn our attention to examining the 
voting behaviour o f TD in Dail divisions. The chapter concludes by probing 
the problems associated with our roll-call analysis.
2.2 COHESION AND DISCIPLINE
In a study o f this nature it is very easy to equate the terms ‘cohesion’ and 
‘discipline’. However each expression, despite being frequently used 
interchangeably, has a very different meaning. The differences are 
fundamental to understanding the true meaning o f what we are trying to 
explore - party discipline.
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In physics cohesion is related to the force that holds together the atoms or 
molecules in a solid or liquid and is distinguished from adhesion where the 
opposite force exists. Likewise in its common use cohesion is associated with 
unity and coming together. Discipline on the other hand refers to obedience 
and more especially a conditioning training associated with behaviour 
modification.
Consequently when we talk about cohesion and discipline in parliamentary 
parties we are really talking about two different things. Indeed while the aim 
of discipline is to ensure cohesion (in voting behaviour for example) attempts 
at discipline may fail. Likewise cohesion can occur naturally without any 
hand (visible or invisible) from the party leadership.
Thus what we ordinarily refer to as discipline may not be discipline at all. 
One can have a state o f cohesion without discipline - spontaneous discipline 
or what we term natural cohesion. In such cases what w e term ‘discipline’ 
and which we are concerned is not an issue in party solidarity. Such natural 
cohesion in political parties can be thought of as being similar to an 
equilibrium condition in classical economics. Citing the now dated but still 
important work o f Ozbudun (1970), Bowler et. al. (1997, p. 4) summarise the 
argument as follows:
whenever we observe members o f legislatures voting as a
bloc, or otherwise acting in unison, this can be because
3 7
either the members agree with each other, or because they 
are being made to act in accord with each other despite their 
personal preferences (or perhaps, a combination o f the two)
Thus we must first o f all attempt to establish if the collective behaviour of 
parliamentary party members results from natural cohesion rather than 
enforced party discipline.
Do members o f the same political party share the same political and social 
values and policy beliefs? Are they, for example, ideologically cohesive? 
Downs identified ideology as ‘verbal images o f a good society and the chief 
means o f constructing such a society’ (Downs, 1957, p. 96). Certainly 
ideology must be the cornerstone upon which cohesion rests - unless 
parliamentarians are so awe inspired by their leader that they automatically 
accept his or her every desire.
2.3 COHESIVENESS OF IRISH PARTIES
Providing a reliable measure o f party cohesion is no easy task. How is one to 
estimate the degree to which a group o f people have the same ideas and 
beliefs, especially when their expressions of belief may not be their own?
A first attempt may be to hypothesise that a party system that is ideologically 
divided along several cleavages will have parties that are more naturally
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cohesive. In theory at least, a politician with a different variety o f beliefs 
along several cleavages could find a more suitable party if  a larger number o f 
parties existed in a given democracy. Thus in a two party system, where 
political cleavages are multiple, parties will by definition probably be less 
ideologically coherent. Each party will have factions that are at home to the 
differing beliefs even if all members o f the party share the same view on a 
single issue.
I f  the number o f parties in a party system is an indication o f the internal 
natural coherence, then many would suggest that Irish parties are probably 
internally coherent given the number of parties in the party system. However 
as we can see from table 2.1 relative to other western European countries 
Ireland does not have a large effective number o f parties1.
1 'Effective n u m b e r  of p a rties ' ta k e s  in to  a c co u n t n o t only th e  n u m b e r  of 
a c tu a l p a rtie s  b u t  th e  size of e ach  an d  is  therefo re  a  b e tte r  in d ica to r of th e  
level of frac tiona lisa tion  a n d  fragm en ta tion  th a n  th e  a c tu a l n u m b er of parties .
T A B L E  2.1
E F F E C T IV E  N U M B E R  OF PAR TIES IN  P A R L IA M E N T
United Kingdom 2.3
Germany 2 . 6
Austria 3.0
France 3.0
Ire land 3.5
Sweden 3.5
Iceland 3.8
Luxembourg 3.9
Denmark 4.5
Norway 4.8
Finland 5.2
Netherlands 5.4
Switzerland 6.7
Italy 7.3
Belgium 8.4
(Source: Gallagher et.al., 1995, p. 290)
Consequently the Republic o f Ireland appears to have one of the least 
fragmented and fractionalised party systems o f any European country. A 
major determinant o f this is the origin o f  the modern Irish party system. The 
origin is important because it indicates the cleavages which are represented 
by the parties and their capacity to represent different chapels.
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In general the Irish Party system appears to be uniquely non-ideological . The 
two largest political parties are composed o f members and deputies who do 
not necessarily have strong ideological differences along numerous cleavages 
with their counterparts in the other party. Certainly, and as one would expect, 
ideological coherence probably becomes stronger as one moves away from 
the centre. However in general, the origin and nature o f the party system 
would not suggest strong natural cohesion along most (non-nationalist) policy 
dimensions. W riting in the early 1980s Carty (1981, p. 85) noted the makeup 
o f the party system in the following terms:
the Irish party system is unique. In no other European polity 
does a small number o f programmatically indistinguishable 
parties, each commanding heterogeneous electoral support, 
constitute the entire party system.
The Irish party system is conventionally dated as beginning in the 1920s 
following the split in the republican movement over the Anglo Irish Treaty of 
1921. Thus, unlike in most other western European countries, the two largest 
parties that now exist in the state were formed along a nationalist cleavage far 
removed from the traditional or contemporary cleavages o f conflict such as
2 ,
2 For an  overview of the  party  system  see Mair (1987)
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those identified by Rokkan and Lipset in their seminal work on party system 
(L ipset&  Rokkan, 1967, p. 13-26, however c.f. Kissane, 1995).3
Mair (1996, p. 89) notes the uniqueness o f the party system which he 
attributes to its origin:
in short, at least as far as the centre-right is concerned, the 
origins o f the Irish parties bear little or no relation to those 
elsewhere in western Europe, and for this reason also 
Ireland has tended to be regarded as a unique case. It is not 
surprising that this should be so. The[largest two] Irish 
parties in fact emerged from a unique experience in the 
period 1916-23, during which an intra-nationalist conflict 
and civil war experience centring on the country’s 
constitutional status followed an armed independence 
struggle.
An alternative method that could be used to measure natural party cohesion is 
to look at the voting behaviour o f TDs in each party where they were given a 
free vote by the whips. This has occurred very infrequently in recent years. 
W here it has occurred it has been related to issues o f a moral nature (such as 
legislating for contraception or divorce). One famous case o f a free vote 
occurred in 1974 relating to the vote on the Importation and Sale of 
Contraception Bill. The Fine Gael/Labour coalition government had
3 The cleavage s tru c tu re  iden tified  were; 1. cen tre  - periphery , 2. c h u rc h  -
4 2
introduced the bill following the decision o f the Supreme Court in M cG ee  v 
Irelan d  that married couples were entitled to use and if  necessary import 
contraceptives for their personal use. The bill was obviously fraught with 
difficulty for the more conservative members o f Fine Gael. The party 
therefore agreed to allow a free vote. Gallagher (1982, p. 202) notes that the 
Taoiseach was joined by Richard Burke (the Fine Gael Minister for 
Education) and five Fine Gael backbenchers in the opposition lobby ensuring 
the defeat o f their own government’s Bill for the Control o f the Importation, 
Sale and Manufacture o f Contraceptive, by 75 votes to 61.
In April 1983 the Fine Gael Parliamentary Party again agreed that because 
eight o f its deputies had conscientious objections to its formula to amend the 
constitution to prohibit abortion, disciplinary action would not be taken 
against members who did not support the Fine Gael motion.
An even more unusual occurrence was the voting behaviour o f the Fine Gael 
party on the 1972 Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill when it 
passed its final stages in December of that year. On the occasion o f the voting 
the Fianna Fail government won the support o f a number o f  opposition 
deputies including Liam Cosgrave, the leader o f Fine Gael.4
s ta te , 3. ru ra l  - u rb a n  a n d  4. c la ss
4 see  fu rth e r  p. 80.
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Indeed in the few cases where a free vote has been allowed the government 
parties always lost the support o f a number, albeit a small number, o f  their 
backbenchers and in some cases as mentioned above their frontbench 
members. Consequently this would lead to the tentative conclusion that when 
the loss o f the whip is not a factor for deputies not all will be in agreement 
with their parliamentary colleagues.
The above suggests that we have no basis to suggest that Irish political parties 
are more naturally cohesive than their counterparts. Indeed we could even 
suggest that they may be less naturally cohesive.
2.4 ROLL-CALL ANALYSIS
As we have seen in chapter one, the voting behaviour o f members of 
parliament is used as a convincing guide to the level o f discipline in political 
parties. Political scientists have employed roll call analysis to help measure 
the degree o f voting along party lines in legislatures. A roll call analysis is 
concerned with examining the voting record o f parliamentarians by 
systematically measuring how they vote over a given period o f time. This 
methodology can be used to measure voting by TDs in Dail divisions, given 
that all divisions are recorded and published.
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As with all aspects o f procedure in the house Standing Orders govern the 
voting mechanism in the Dail. Under standing order 65.1 the Ceann 
Comhairle (or his deputy acting in his absence) puts the question to be 
considered to the house. Members vote by replying Ta (yes) or N il (no). 
However in reality a formal vote is taken wherever there is opposition from 
the other side o f the house (or if  either side want to cause maximum 
disruption to the running of business). Under standing order 65 .2 a division is 
called if any deputy so wishes. The division bells will normally ring for four 
minutes to notify members that a vote is about to take place. All rooms in 
Leinster House and Government Buildings have an intercom system so all 
present in the buildings are aware a vote has been called.
During the vote the doors are locked and all deputies wishing to vote must 
physically pass through either o f the two lobbies. The party whips usually act 
as tellers and record members as they pass through the respective lobbies. 
Once all have voted the gates are closed and the number o f names totalled 
The slip with the totals is then given to the Ceann Comhairle and the names 
o f those voting Ta or N il  are placed on the record o f the house. Importantly it 
is not possible to have an abstention noted
the methodology
To measure the cohesiveness o f voting we examined divisions in the Dail and 
measured the degree to which the composition o f each voting block was
voting in the Dail
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determined by party. In a division two measurable blocks exist - yes (7a) and 
no (Nil). W hat we want to look at is the cohesiveness o f each group - for 
example the cohesiveness o f the government group. This is determined not by 
examining who votes in the government block but who votes in the 
opposition block. If  the opposition block is composed only o f members o f the 
opposition then the government party or parties vote cohesively.
Likewise we can measure the cohesiveness o f the opposition by examining 
the composition o f the government cohort. If the government block consists 
solely o f government deputies (and consequently no opposition deputies) then 
we can say that members o f the opposition parties voted cohesively.
For each block (each yes, no over every vote measured) we have compiled an 
index of cohesion based on the following formula:
x / y  * 1 0 0 /1  
where:
x  = the number o f deputies voting in the same block from the same group 
y =  the total number o f deputies voting in the same block
To show how the index operates consider a division involving only two 
parties. If  200 deputies vote, made up o f 150 government and 50 opposition,
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and all vote along party lines then the index o f cohesion is for the 
government:
50/50 * 100/1 = 1 0 0 %
and for the opposition the index of cohesion is calculated as:
150/150 * 100/1 = 100 %
To better understand why government cohesion is obtained from examining 
the voting patterns in the opposition block consider a case where five 
government backbenchers vote with the opposition. The index for the 
government would be 
50/55 * 100/1 = 90.90% #
group versus block
In our analysis we take a group as the collection or coalition o f parties. This is 
necessitated by the multiparty nature of the Dail which means that more than 
one party will usually be voting the same way in divisions. The block 
represents all parties where a majority o f the voting members voted the same 
way. One methodological problem which we encountered was how to deal 
with independent (non-affiliated) TDs. In recent times independent TDs 
usually vote with the opposition parties but on occasions they side with and 
support the government. An exception to this is when minority governments
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depend on the support o f individual independents.5 As they are not subject to 
a whip we would need to discount their impact so that they would not distort 
the figures. But our method o f analysis ensured that their votes were nullified 
in the formula we used. Consequently as the government consisted o f three 
parties, and the opposition of two parties with a number o f floating 
independent TDs we measured cohesion with reference to two groups. One 
group consisted o f government TDs and the other o f TDs from the opposition 
parties. As mentioned above the vote o f the independent deputies was 
allowed to float between government and opposition so that it would not 
distort the figures for the parties.
There is little point in examining every single vote taken since the foundation 
o f the Dail. For one thing it would simply take too much time and would 
involve methodological problems in matching deputies with their party. 
Consequently it was decided to select one calendar year and examine all 
divisions taken in the Dail during that year. As at the time o f research 1996 
was the last complete year for which Dail records were available it was 
selected for the study.
5 As y e t th e re  is  no  sa tisfac to ry  s tu d y  of in d e p e n d e n t m em b ers  of th e  Dail or
Seanad.
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As noted above the Dâil proceedings which are published and made available 
to the public show how each voting member voted. To undertake a roll call 
analysis it was necessary to assign each voting member to their respective 
political affiliation. Nealon (1993) provided a list o f TDs with their party 
affiliation. Gallagher (1996) was used to update the affiliation lists to take 
account o f deaths and by-elections. More recent changes in the composition 
o f the house along with changes in party affiliation were obtained from 
various issues o f The Irish Times.
the results
During the calendar year 1996 there were 93 divisions in the Dâil. Table 2.2 
reproduces the results o f our analysis for the government block while table 
2.3 reproduces the results for the opposition block.
undertaking the research
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TABLE 2.2: COHESION OF GOVERNMENT GROUP (1996)
|  DATE HJIJO ) i 
(opposition)
yt s ■ 
(government)
GOV COHESION %
23-Jan 460/3 831-834 72 72 100
23-Jan 460/3 891-894 68 68 100
25-Jan 460/5 1302-1303 59 59 100
07-Feb 461/2 343-346 58 58 100
07-Feb 461/2 361-364 56 56 100
08-Feb 461/3 647-650 39 39 100
21-Feb 461/8 2393-2396 57 57 100
28-Feb 462/3 641-644 55 55 100
28-Feb 462/3 875-878 53 53 100
28-Feb 462/3 879-882 53 53 100
28-Feb 462/3 891-894 52 52 100
06-Mar 462/6 1757-1760 58 58 100
13-Mar 463/1 291-294 42 42 100
03-Apr 463/7 1911-1914 57 57 100
16-Apr 463/8 2217-2220 61 61 100
17-Apr 464/1 293-296 58 58 100
18-Apr 464/2 525-528 57 57 100
24-Apr 464/4 1149-1152 53 53 100
01-May 464/7 1751-1754 50 50 100
01 -May 464/7 1909-1912 51 51 100
01 -May 464/7 1959-1962 52 52 100
01-May 464/7 2001-2004 54 54 100
02-May 464/8 2203-2206 43 43 100
08-May 465/1 311-314 58 58 100
09-May 465/2 537-540 34 34 100
15-May 465/4 887-890 57 57 100
15-May 465/4 889-892 58 58 100
15-May 465/4 1123-1126 53 53 100
15-May 465/4 1195-1198 63 63 100
16-May 465/5 1213-1216 53 53 100
22-May 465/7 2015-2018 58 58 100
22-May 465/7 2055-2058 44 44 100
28-May 466/1 255-258 54 54 100
29-May 466/2 327-330 56 56 100
29-May 466/2 331-334 56 56 100
29-May 466/2 339-342 56 56 100
06-Jun 466/5 1293-1296 56 56 100
11-Jun 466/6 1690-1692 62 62 100
12-Jun 446/7 1789-1792 59 59 100
12-Jun 446/7 2031-2034 57 57 100
12-Jun 446/7 2033-2036 58 58 100
18-Jun 467/1 249-254 69 69 100
18-Jun 467/1 253-256 67 67 100
18-Jun 467/1 255-258 68 68 100
18-Jun 467/1 293-298 68 68 100
19-Jun 467/2 385-388 59 59 100
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DATE FOllO y
¿opposition)
X
(government)
GOV COHESION %
19-Jun 467/2 635-638 61 61 100
20-Jun 467/3 675-678 62 62 100
20-Jun 467/3 677-680 60 60 100
20-Jun 467/3 681-684 60 60 100
26-Jun 467/5 1373-1376 51 51 100
26-Jun 467/5 1383-1386 53 53 100
26-Jun 467/5 1647-1650 54 54 100
02-Jul 467/7 2351-2354 59 59 100
02-Jul 467/7 2362-2364 59 59 100
05-Jul 468/3 765-768 54 54 100
05-Jul 468/3 769-772 56 56 100
05-Jul 468/3 871-874 50 50 100
25-Jul 468/4 1105-1107 58 58 100
25-Sep 469/1 533-536 49 49 100
25-Sep 469/1 545-548 49 49 100
26-Sep 469/2 721-724 51 51 100
03-Oct 469/4 1309-1312 54 54 100
03-0ct 469/4 1317-1320 52 52 100
09-0ct 469/6 1951-1954 61 61 100
09-0ct 469/6 1995-1996 60 60 100
09-0ct 469/6 1997-2000 58 58 100
09-0ct 469/6 1999-2002 59 59 100
15-Oct 470/1 171-172 54 54 100
16-Oct 470/2 493-496 56 56 100
17-Oct 470/3 555-556 50 50 100
17-Oct 470/3 557-560 51 51 100
23-Oct 470/5 1091-1094 58 58 100
23-Oct 470/5 1093-1096 58 58 100
30-0ct 470/7 1377-1380 57 57 100
31-Oct 470/8 1643-1646 63 63 100
06-Nov 471/2 241-244 56 56 100
06-Nov 471/2 269-270 56 56 100
06-Nov 471/2 281-284 55 55 100
06-Nov 471/2 383-386 53 53 100
13-Nov 471/5 1005-1008 70 70 100
20-Nov 471/7 1375-1378 60 60 100
27-Nov 472/2 305-308 55 55 100
27-Nov 472/2 315-318 54 54 100
03-Dec 472/3 547-550 56 56 100
05-Dec 472/5 999-1000 56 56 100
10-Dec 472/6 1233-1234 55 55 100
11-Dec 472/7 1507-1510 62 62 100
11-Dec 472/7 1509-1512 64 64 100
18-Dec 473/2 363-366 63 63 100
18-Dec 473/2 467-470 60 60 100
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TABLE 2.3: COHESION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES (1996)
DATE mm mm M
(government)
OPP COHESION %
23-Jan 460/3 831-834 80 80 100
23-Jan 460/3 891-894 79 79 100
25-Jan 460/5 1302-1303 69 69 100
07-Feb 461/2 343-346 71 71 100
07-Feb 461/2 361-364 71 71 100
08-Feb 461/3 647-650 62 62 100
21-Feb 461/8 2393-2396 69 69 100
28-Feb 462/3 641-644 74 74 100
28-Feb 462/3 875-878 66 66 100
28-Feb 462/3 879-882 66 66 100
28-Feb 462/3 891-894 68 68 100
06-Mar 462/6 1757-1760 73 73 100
13-Mar 463/1 291-294 55 55 100
03-Apr 463/7 1911-1914 72 72 100
16-Apr 463/8 2217-2220 68 68 100
17-Apr 464/1 293-296 70 70 100
18-Apr 464/2 525-528 68 68 100
24-Apr 464/4 1149-1152 65 65 100
01-May 464/7 1751-1754 66 66 100
01-May 464/7 1909-1912 64 64 100
01-May 464/7 1959-1962 65 65 100
01-May 464/7 2001-2004 64 64 100
02-May 464/8 2203-2206 60 60 100
08-May 465/1 311-314 68 68 100
09-Mav 465/2 537-540 60 60 100
15-May 465/4 887-890 70 70 100
15-May 465/4 889-892 70 70 100
15-May 465/4 1123-1126 69 69 100
15-May 465/4 1195-1198 68 68 100
16-May 465/5 1213-1216 63 63 100
22-May 465/7 2015-2018 64 64 100
22-May 465/7 2055-2058 66 66 100
2 8-May 466/1 255-258 63 63 100
29-May 466/2 327-330 70 70 100
29-May 466/2 331-334 69 69 100
06-Jun 466/5 1293-1296 68 68 100
11-Jun 466/6 1690-1692 61 61 100
12-Jun 446/7 1789-1792 72 72 100
12-Jun 446/7 2031-2034 69 69 100
12-Jun 446/7 2033-2036 67 67 100
18-Jun 467/1 249-254 76 76 100
18-Jun 467/1 253-256 76 76 100
18-Jun 467/1 255-258 75 75 100
18-Jun 467/1 290-294 76 76 100
18-Jun 467/1 293-298 75 75 100
19-Jun 467/2 385-388 71 71 100
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DATE ' FÖJ1Ö y
(government)
;
(opposition)
! %m>P COHESION %
19-Jun 467/2 635-638 69 69 100
20-Jun 467/3 675-678 68 68 100
20-Jun 467/3 677-680 68 68 100
20-Jun 467/3 681-684 70 70 100
26-Jun 467/5 1373-1376 62 62 100
26-Jun 467/5 1383-1386 64 64 100
26-Jun 467/5 1647-1650 61 61 100
02-Jul 467/7 2351-2354 72 72 100
02-Jul 467/7 2362-2364 72 72 100
05-Jul 468/3 765-768 67 67 100
05-Jul 468/3 769-772 68 68 100
05-Jul 468/3 871-874 64 64 100
25-Jul 468/4 1105-1107 72 72 100
25-Sep 469/1 533-536 61 61 100
25-Sep 469/1 545-548 60 60 100
26-Sep 469/2 721-724 61 61 100
03-Oct 469/4 1309-1312 67 67 100
03-Oct 469/4 1317-1320 67 67 100
09-0ct 469/6 1951-1954 75 75 100
09-0ct 469/6 1995-1996 70 70 100
09-0ct 469/6 1997-2000 70 70 100
09-0ct 469/6 1999-2002 70 70 100
15-Oct 470/1 171-172 67 67 100
16-Oct 470/2 493-496 70 70 100
17-Oct 470/3 555-556 67 67 100
17-Oct 470/3 557-560 65 65 100
23-Oct 470/5 1091-1094 72 72 100
23-Oct 470/5 1093-1096 71 71 100
30-0ct 470/7 1377-1380 64 64 100
31-Oct 470/8 1643-1646 69 69 100
06-Nov 471/2 241-244 68 68 100
06-Nov 471/2 269-270 69 69 100
06-Nov 471/2 281-284 66 66 100
06-Nov 471/2 383-386 63 63 100
13-Nov 471/5 1005-1008 79 79 100
27-Nov 472/2 305-308 65 65 100
27-Nov 472/2 315-318 64 64 100
03-Dec 472/3 547-550 68 68 100
05-Dec 472/5 999-1000 67 67 100
10-Dec 472/6 1233-1234 65 65 100
11-Dec 472/7 1507-1510 74 74 100
11-Dec 472/7 1509-1512 74 74 100
18-Dec 473/2 363-366 68 68 100
18-Dec 473/2 405-408 72 72 100
18-Dec 473/2 467-470 73 73 100
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In all Dâil divisions taken during 1996 each group (and consequently each 
party) showed complete and absolute voting cohesion. W riting over twenty 
five years ago about the behaviour o f British MPs Samuel Beer (1969, p. 350- 
351) noted that voting cohesion ‘was so close to 100 per cent that there was 
no longer any point in measuring it.’ The results o f our analysis o f voting 
behaviour give the same impression.
issues
W e are basing voting cohesion on two possible actions by TDs: vote yes or 
vote no. However a third option is available to parliamentarians - abstention. 
This involves declining to vote with the party or with the opposition and is 
potentially a useful indicator o f cohesion and discipline. Our case study 
analysis in chapter three indicates that a number o f Dâil deputies show their 
disapproval with policy or the party by abstaining rather than voting against 
their party.
However there are major problems with incorporating abstentions into any 
roll call analysis o f the Dâil. Firstly, and as already mentioned, the records of 
the Dâil do not include those who abstain. Furthermore, and even more 
problematically, a number o f different reasons cause deputies to abstain. 
Many o f these have nothing to do with a revolt against the party. For example 
a system of ‘pairing’ exists whereby a deputy from one side may be allowed 
to be absent (away on official government business for example) and is paired
analysis
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off against a member o f the opposite side o f the house. The pairing system is 
operated by the party whips and the government chief whip but each pair is 
the consequence o f a gentlem an’s understanding rather than a  formal signed 
agreement. Consequently it is impossible to identify systematically when 
pairing has occurred.
As we will see in later chapters in some case non-voting arises simply 
because a deputy has forgotten to vote. Either they did not know that the vote 
was taking place or they did not know that they were required to be present 
Again it is impossible to differentiate between those abstentions and 
abstentions for the purpose o f showing disagreement with the issue and party. 
For these reasons a roll-call analysis including an index o f participation 
would not be feasible.
2.5 SUMMARY
The evidence presented in this chapter clearly shows that, during 1996 at 
least, Irish parliamentarians are as disciplined in their voting behaviour as 
they can be. The nature o f the party system allied to the complexity of 
legislative issues facing TDs suggests that this cohesion is based on discipline 
rather than any natural cohesiveness among members o f the same party and 
differences between parties. We can therefore turn our attention to
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understanding the nature o f discipline in Irish parties confident in the 
knowledge that they are well disciplined.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE OR GAN ISA TION OF PAR TY 
POLITICS IN IRELAND
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses Irish parties, their parliamentary representatives and 
how so much of the internal organisation of the parties is devoted to affecting 
the behaviour o f their parliamentarians. In doing so we consider the rules and 
regulations o f the main political parties to gauge their expectations (and 
justifications) o f loyalty. W e begin by reviewing the work of others who have 
examined discipline in Irish parties.
3.2 IRISH PARTIES AND DISCIPLINE
There exists a consensus among political scientists that Irish parliamentary 
parties are highly disciplined creatures. Basic Chubb, whom many regard as 
the doyen  o f Irish political studies, notes that it is very rare for deputies to 
defy their party and ever more unlikely for single party governments to be 
defeated where they enjoy a majority in the Dail and Seanad (Chubb, 1992).
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Examining the weakness o f the Dail as a parliament, Gallagher (1993, p. 146) 
points to the high level o f discipline within political parties as the most 
important reason for the dominance by the government o f the Dail:
deputies behave not as individuals but as members o f a 
party. When it comes to the crunch, deputies in most 
parliaments follow the party line; when political life is 
dominated by political parties, as is the case throughout 
Europe, deputies’ orientation to party is stronger than their
orientation to parliament the solidarity o f party voting in
the Dail is extraordinarily high, to the extent that any 
government TD voting against any government bill, apart 
from those very rare occasions when a free-vote is allowed, 
is likely to be expelled from the parliamentary party.
Laver and Schofield (1991, p. 229) in reviewing the unitary actor model of 
coalition theory also note the high level o f discipline in Irish parliamentary 
parties, writing that ‘the parties as constituted tend to function as unitary 
actors’ and that the level o f legislative voting discipline, especially in the 
larger parties, allow governments to continue in office even where they exist 
on wafer-thin majorities.
Gallagher (1988, p. 133) explains the high level o f discipline in Irish 
parliamentary parties as follows:
5 8
the main reason for this [voting solidarity] is the salience of 
party in binding the parliamentary group together and in 
determining voters’ behaviour. Deputies have a loyalty to 
their party, an emotional identification with it, and a 
disposition to respect the decisions it and its parliamentary 
group reach.
Gallagher also notes that deputies know that their chances o f re-election are 
small if  they lose the party whip and they will forego any possibility of 
promotion to the party front bench or government ministry if they step out of 
line with party policy.
O ’Halpin (1997b, p .15) notes that Irish parties are very effective in enforcing 
discipline and that the ultimate threat is expulsion from the parliamentary 
party, which among other things would deprive TDs o f parliamentary 
benefits. He also notes that ‘in practice expulsion has tended to be o f short 
duration: either the recalcitrant member shows some signs o f penitence and is 
readmitted to the fold, or he is left to fight the next election without party 
support and is therefore unlikely to hold on to his seat’.
Chubb (1992) focuses upon the political culture which stems from the 
struggle against British rule at the turn o f the century and the deep divisions 
caused by the civil war which resulted from the Anglo Irish Treaty o f 1921. 
Parties emerged as it were from the shadow of military machines where 
loyalty and respect for superiors was a virtue. It translated into a political
5 9
virtue as a strong allegiance to party elite was established. Changing sides 
was considered absolutely unthinkable, and treated in a similar way as spying 
or treason would be in another country
In examining the case for electoral reform in Ireland Laver (1996, p. 488) 
concurs with the belief that party discipline ‘depends ultimately upon the 
threat to expel dissidents and deny them the comfort o f the party label at the 
next election’. However in the same report Laver concludes that the Irish 
electoral system, (proportional representation by means o f a single 
transferable vote), which support the selection and election o f candidates on 
the basis o f local power bases rather than party label, discourages discipline.
Chubb also rejects the idea that deputies feel compelled for their own good to 
be highly disciplined. He argues that because it is possible for a deputy to 
leave one party, or even be expelled, and still retain his or her seat at the next 
election no real mechanism exists for parties to enforce discipline.
3.3 T H E  P A R T Y  R U LE S
Political parties expect their deputies to ‘toe the line’. However parties try to 
indicate to their potential members what precisely is expected o f them. This 
and the standing/usefulness o f party rules are now considered.
6 0
Even before they are elected, candidates are typically required to provide a 
pledge o f allegiance and loyalty to the party. This pledge occurs at a number 
o f distinct levels o f party involvement:
1. Upon becoming an ordinary member one must sign a pledge of support for 
the aims o f the party and the party rules. These usually require one to support 
the party on all issues. All the main political parties have such a document 
setting out the rules o f membership, a statement o f the general principles of 
the party and the organisational structure. For example Article II.I o f the 
Constitution o f the Labour Party (1992, p. 1) reads:
Any person who -
(a) subscribes to the Principles and Objectives o f the Party 
and accepts this constitution,
(b) is not a member o f any other political party or o f an 
organisation subsidiary or ancillary thereto, and
(c) is not a member of, or associated with any organisation, 
publication or other institution the objects or activities o f 
which have been declared by the General Council to be 
injurious to the interests o f the Party or inconsistent with its 
Principles and Objectives, shall be eligible for membership 
o f the Party.
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2. A ‘solemn pledge’ is required by the larger parties for those in the party 
standing for election as a party candidate. For instance in Fine Gael the 
selected candidate is required to sign a declaration o f support and an 
undertaking to uphold the party rules for the chairperson o f the selection 
convention in full view o f all present.
Following internal dissent in the 1970s the declaration required by the Labour 
Party from candidates became more precise, and it now pledges them if 
elected to undertake to sit, vote and act with the party. Furthermore they are 
required to accept any instructions given to them by the Parliamentary Labour 
Party and to obey the party whip at all times and under all circumstances. 
Moreover they must agree to resign their seats if  so requested by the 
parliamentary party.
The Fianna Fail pre-election contract with candidates requires the candidate 
to resign his or her seat if a two-thirds majority o f the party’s national 
executive so instructs. This is expected to guard against TDs who are 
expelled or cross the floor o f the house to join another party. The Fianna Fail 
declaration also requires the candidate to conduct the campaign on the 
instructions o f the national director o f elections.
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The problem o f course, for the party leadership, is that such pledges are not 
treated as legally binding contracts. Thus if a deputy does cross the floor calls 
will be made by the politicians o f his own party for him or her to resign the 
seat. However no one seriously expects anyone to resign their Dail seat 
because they signed a pledge to do so before the previous election.
consequence
FIGURE 3.1: THE PLEDGE TAKEN BY FIANNA FAIL  
CANDIDATES FOR GENERAL ELECTIO N S
Realising the honour conferred on me if  selected as a 
candidate for Fianna Fail, I undertake to conduct the 
election campaign in accordance with the instructions 
o f the Director o f  Elections and to refrain from doing 
anything inimical to the prestige o f the Organisation. I, 
(name o f person), do hereby signify my consent to 
stand if selected as a candidate for the constituency o f 
(name o f constituency) and pledge myself, if  elected, 
to work to the best o f my ability for the Aims and 
Objectives o f Fianna Fail, as stated in the Coru, and to 
abide at all times by majority decisions o f the Party or 
resign my seat as Teachta Dala. I further promise that 
if  called upon by the National Executive, by a two- 
thirds majority o f the members present, and voting, at a 
meeting specifically convened for the purpose, to 
resign my seat as Teachta Dala, I will do so.
signed:
(Source: Fianna Fail, 1988)
Pledges such as these can conceivably take two forms: those that are nothing 
more than an empty declaration and those that have the force o f law and are
thus legally binding. W hile it has never been tested it is taken for granted by 
those concerned that the pledges relating to party loyalty belong to the latter 
type.
The legal issues surrounding such pledges or promises is certainly 
ambiguous. The law is generally seen as conferring no legal basis to promises 
or pledges o f any kind unless they are contractual in nature. To be o f a 
contractual nature a number of criteria must apply, most importantly the 
existence o f consideration . 1 Given the probable absence of consideration it 
would appear that promises, no matter how formal their nature, have no legal 
basis. From time to time however, and in matters in no way related to politics
or politicians, the Irish courts have ordered that effect be given to promises
• ■ 2 when one o f the parties to the promise have reneged.
Article 16,1.1. o f the 1937 Constitution which deals with the membership of 
the Dail and Seanad provides that:
Every citizen without distinction of sex who has 
reached the age o f twenty-one years, and who is not 
placed under disability or incapacity by this
' Consideration is a legal term which means that for a contract to be legally binding each party 
to the agreement must in some way give up something in return for receiving something else 
(Smith, 1992).
2 See for example the case in 1950 involving a Protestant father who made a pre-marital 
promise to bring any children resulting from the marriage in the Roman Catholic faith. 
However he later placed the children in a Protestant home so that they could be raised as 
Protestants. The President of the High Court, Mr Justice Gavan Duffy, ruled that, since he had 
given a written promise to raise the children as Catholics, he was legally obliged to do so The 
children were ordered to be returned to their mother, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court.
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Constitution or by law, shall be eligible for 
membership of Dail Eireann.
The article raises two relevant issues. Firstly ‘m em bership’ seems to include 
continuing membership so that a serving TD who is ‘placed under disability 
or incapacity’ would be required to resign. Secondly, and by extension, the 
article seems to leave open the possibility o f enacting legislation to allow for 
deputies to be removed as the law sees fit. If  this were the case the Oireachtas 
could legislate to force a TD to resign if he or she was expelled from the party 
or changed allegiances. But this has not happened as the Electoral Acts, 
which give legislative force to the article in question, do not cite a change of 
party as a  case for incapacity or disability.
Moreover one leading Irish constitutional expert has hypothesised that Article 
15.2.1 o f the constitution3 is violated by the operation o f the party whip 
system (Morgan, 1997, p. 279 n. 57). However in writing about the separation 
o f powers between the executive and legislator the same author recognises 
that the constitution accepts, to some degree, the fusion of the two branches 
and consequently the de  fa c to  existence o f party discipline.
Another obvious problem is that the courts are loath to interfere with politics 
and are bound by the constitutional articles which provide for the Dail and 
Seanad to operate its own rules and procedures and guarantee independence
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from judicial review save in exceptional circumstances. In such 
circumstances, and given the absence o f any legislation on the issue of 
parties, it seems clear that TDs can resign their seats without the threat of 
legal challenge to remove them from their seat.
The preceding analysis may surprise many political scientists or legal experts 
and may even sound bizarre to some. The justification however lies in the 
fact that in some countries a parliamentarian who does ‘jum p ship’ or is 
expelled is required by law to resign their seat. In India, for example, an MP 
in the House o f the People is deemed to have vacated his or her seat if  they 
defects from the party (Sartori, 1997, p i 92). Haywood (1995, p. 99) notes 
that in Spain deputies who want to leave their own party may not join another 
party. Instead if they leave they join a ‘mixed group’.
M oreover in Israel recent reforms were introduced in an attempt to dissuade 
members o f the Knesset changing allegiances. As Peretz and Doron (1997, p. 
180) note ‘since 1991 an individual MK has been forbidden to leave his or 
her party, join another party, and then be included in that party’s list for the 
next election’.
The irreverence for such solemn declarations was recently exemplified by the 
behaviour o f Councillor Tom Morrissey. Morrissey was selected as a Fine
3 The article reads: ‘ The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is hereby 
vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the State’.
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Gael candidate for the 1997 general election in the Dublin W est constituency, 
taking the oath o f allegiance to the party. But within a w eek he had left the 
party, joined the Progressive Democrats and agreed to accept their 
nomination as a general election candidate and stand against his former party 
in the same constituency (The Irish Times, 5 April 1997).
Nevertheless, paper declarations at least provide evidence o f what the party 
requires o f its parliamentary party members. In their absence it could be 
argued that it would be totally undemocratic for the central party to force 
individual deputies to follow the party line. W hen voters vote for a party 
candidate, with the knowledge that those candidates must be loyal to the party 
and not their constituents (should a conflict exist) they accept that their 
representatives must support the party policy no matter how detested it is by 
the constituents.
3.4 T H E  W H IP  S Y S T E M
Because TDs take a pledge o f allegiance before entering the Dail they are 
expected to support their party on all issues and on all occasions, from giving 
interviews to journalists to attending and voting in the chamber. In order to 
understand the party expectations better we will now look at the role of the 
whips office in keeping backbenchers ‘in line.’
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Origin
Not surprisingly the whip system was first developed in the British parliament 
from which so much o f our parliamentary and governmental system and 
process derives. The actual term whip which conjures up images of 
parliamentarians been whipped into line came from fox hunting, where 
whippers-in or whips are used to look after the hounds and prevent them from 
straying (Richards, 1972, p55., n. 1). Porritt (1903) claims that the first 
attempt to organise and inform individual MPs can be traced back to the early 
1620s when followers o f  King James I received regular reports detailing what 
was happening and what they were required to do in parliament.
Having accepted the 1921 Treaty the drafters o f  the Irish Free State 
Constitution o f 1922 envisaged a governmental and parliamentary system not 
unlike the W estminster model but with some notable differences. Most 
noticeably for us was the expressions o f  hope and desire that parties would 
not be the focal point o f  the political system. One key player, Kevin 
O ’Higgins, then the Vice President o f the Executive Council, declaimed in 
the Dail:
There is nothing admirable in the party system o f Government.
There is much that is evil and open to criticism ... returning to 
the party system o f government, with all its errors and 
anomalies and men voting constantly against what their 
judgem ent dictates simply at the crack o f the party whip. (Dail 
Debates Vol. I, 5 October, 1922, col. 1271)
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However if O ’Higgins believed what he was saying he w as sadly mistaken 
and indeed spoke against the existing proof which indicated that members o f 
an Irish parliament would be heavily whipped4.
The reality was that the members o f the House o f Commons who represented 
Ireland had been amongst the most disciplined group within the parliament 
from the middle o f the nineteenth century onwards. Bracken (1995, p. 7) 
notes that in 1851 John Sadleir and William Keogh were successful in 
forming a group o f Irish MPs which agreed to work together and took a 
pledge to vote as a block. The group were rather despairingly referred to as 
‘the Irish Brigade’ and the ‘Pope’s Brass Band’ - an obvious indication of 
their strong Roman Catholic beliefs. Later they were to form The Irish 
Independent Party, but a split occurred when the two leaders were enticed 
into a coalition with Sir Robert Peel. It was not until Parnell emerged as the 
father o f the Irish cause that discipline was fully restored and the Irish 
members spoke, to a large degree, with a common voice. This was now in the 
form o f the new Irish Parliamentary Party. Cruise O ’Brien (1957, p. 148) 
observing Parnells’ authoritarian grip o f the party, noted that
4 An exception in the early years was the behaviour of Senators. Quoting a member of the Free 
State Senate O ’Sullivan (1940, p. 118) recalls ‘we have our own individual opinion about 
things. I do not believe there is any member of the Senate ... who is belonging to a party or in 
any way shaping his actions or votes in the interest of any party’. The author also notes that 
‘the truth of this statement is exemplified by the division list of the early days . Senators who 
by tradition and habit of m ind might have been supposed to be in agreement frequently voted 
on opposite sides.’
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At the end o f 1885, an organisation existed, such as it was 
impossible to return on the home rule ticket any potential 
opponent o f Parnellite policy. The new members... were 
hand picked, pledge-bound, and paid out o f party funds. The 
‘policy of the party’ came down to them from above, from 
the leader and his lieutenants, and they had no choice but to 
obey
O f course the party was to fall from grace following a split over the 
leadership issue. However even before the state was founded those 
representing the people were aware o f the operation and necessity o f a well 
disciplined and highly whipped party. The early years o f the Fianna Fail party 
also show that a high level o f belief in discipline was inherited. Interestingly 
Mansergh (1997) noted that one example o f Fianna Fail inheriting the
traditions o f the Parnellite party was that the pledge was very similar. In his
analysis if party documents in the early years o f the party O ’Halpin (1997a, p. 
9-10) concluded that
If  the minutes o f meetings are any guide, the main
preoccupation o f the Fianna Fail parliamentary party 
between October 1927 and December 1931 was discipline.
This term embraced not only the basic criterion o f always 
voting as instructed, but a host o f related matters such as 
policy making, speaking in debates, coming to party
meetings, and paying subscriptions when due; maintaining 
the appropriate balance between personal business, local
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authority duties and Dail attendance; relations with 
members o f other parties; and personal behaviour.
Thus from before the foundation o f the state and during the creation o f the 
modern Irish party system discipline was a key issue which parties tackled 
with great effort.
Whip ’.v Role in the Ddil
All o f the main political parties have a whip. Parties in government also have 
a chief whip who is normally the whip for the largest o f the parties in the 
coalition. The government whip, assisted by a small office o f  civil servants 
and private appointments, has the task of setting the business o f the Dail 
from week to week. This is in addition to ensuring that deputies undertake the 
duties levied upon them. These duties include:
1. B eing  in the D d il as req u ired  by the whip. Each week the office o f the 
whip will circulate to members o f the relevant parliamentary party or parties a 
list indicating the business o f the house including debates and likely divisions. 
This memorandum referred to as the ‘w hip’ indicates whether a TD is 
expected to attend or not. If  the debate title is underlined only once then no 
debate is anticipated but nevertheless a TD ought to attend. A two line whip 
indicates that a division is expected and a TD should therefore attend. A triple 
underlining represents a three line whip which indicates that the division is o f
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great importance (for example a vote on the Budget) and all TDs must attend 
no matter what other arrangements they may have had. Failure to attend will 
normally result in some form o f mild rebuke from the whip or more likely the 
party leader.5
On occasions the party whip may want to make an example o f the offenders - 
like a headmaster disciplining a pupil for a relatively minor offence and 
holding the episode up as an warning to others. Thus the current practice is 
for the party leader to summon the offenders and ask for an explanation In 
the past some unusual and bizarre excuses have emerged .6
2. Voting with the p a r ty . Not supporting the party in a division, or knowingly 
failing to support it by abstaining, is a much more serious offence which the 
whip must also deal with. It has become practice for a TD who has disobeyed 
the party line, either by voting against the party or abstaining in protest, to be 
expelled from the parliamentary party for an unspecified period. In some 
parties, such as Labour, the expulsion is automatic. A guilty TD receives a 
letter from the party whip (or in some instances the Leader or Chairman of
5 One exception to the rule that TD are normally required to be present for voting occurs in the 
case of former Taoisigh who ‘upon leaving office are given considerable latitude in terms of 
voting, involvement in Dail business and attending parliamentary party meetings’ (The Irish 
Times, 20 November 1997). However this did not stop the government chief whip requesting 
the presence of Albert Reynolds for voting because the government was in a minority position.
6 Take for example the case of deputy John Jinks in August 1927 after he missed a crucial vote 
of confidence in the Dail . Following the incident he told The Irish Times (August 20 1927) ‘I 
did not wish to create a split by voting against any party or by announcing my decision in 
advance. I just thought the best thing to do was to leave the House before the division and go 
back to my hotel’. However Moss (1968) recalls that Jinks had been ‘wined and dined’ by 
members of the opposition in advance of the debate and was found ‘in O ’Connell Street gazing
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the Parliamentary Party) informing them o f their expulsion. At the next 
meeting o f the parliamentary party meeting it is simply noted that the person 
in question has been deemed to have been expelled.
In the two main parties, expulsion is not automatic and a motion must be put 
in front o f the parliamentary meeting calling for the expulsion o f the 
individual concerned. The motion is normally tabled in the names o f the party 
leader and the party whip. At the meeting the individual concerned is given an 
opportunity to oppose the motion and his supporters, if  any, can attempt to 
either have the motion withdrawn or defeated in a vote.
Surprisingly such motions do not generally appear to be accepted without 
debate and division within the parliamentary party. The agenda and minutes 
of meetings are kept strictly confidential and a TD can be expelled for even 
commenting to a journalist on the events o f a meeting. However two 
examples illustrate the difficulty faced by some party leaders in having 
motions to expel members accepted:
In October 1979 Dr Bill Loughnane, a Fianna Fail deputy representing the 
rural constituency of Clare, was openly critical o f the party leader, Mr Jack 
Lynch over disclosures o f a secret agreement made by the Fianna Fail 
government with the British Prime Minister concerning cross-border security
up at the Nelson Pillar’ . In recent years excuses have included feeling as if  one was about to 
get the flu or thinking that the vote was over.
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cooperation. At the time Lynch was out o f the country on an official visit to 
the United States, which could add credence to the old saying in politics that 
‘when the cat is away the mice will play’. Loughnane publicly claimed that 
Lynch had lied to the Parliamentary Party meeting which took place on 24 
October. At that meeting Tom McEllistrim, a Kerry backbencher, had placed 
a motion ‘opposing any concessions to the United Kingdom on cross border 
troop movement.’ The motion was withdrawn when the Taoiseach assured 
the meeting that no change to the sovereignty o f the state had occurred. The 
matter o f Loughnane’s public criticism o f the Toaiseach was placed for 
consideration before the meeting o f the Parliamentary Party to be held on 14 
November. Before the meeting it was felt that the only conceivable course of 
action was to have the whip withdrawn and the Taoiseach clearly indicated 
his desire that this happen telling the media that he was sure the matter would 
be ‘dealt with firmly’. However Loughnane’s fellow backbenchers took a 
different opinion of what should happen. W hen he agreed to withdraw his 
statement against Lynch, the Parliamentary Party declined to move the motion 
to withdraw the whip. W hat this episode clearly demonstrates is that the 
withdrawal o f the whip where it is not automatic can be troublesome for the 
party leadership.
Bearing in mind the importance o f the whole issue o f whips it is difficult to 
believe that the largest political party never drafted formal rules governing the 
removal o f the parliamentary party whip until 1993, some 67 years after its
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foundation (The Irish Times, 9 July 1993). The set o f  standing orders also 
deal with issues such as leadership selection and de-selection. It specified for 
the first time that any member who votes against the party or abstains in Dail 
or Seanad divisions will automatically have the whip removed.
A new development was the adoption o f the rule that expelled members can 
only have the whip restored following the acceptance o f a motion to the 
parliamentary party. Furthermore the motion must be proposed by the party 
whip. This obviously makes it more dangerous for members to dissent 
believing that the parliamentary party will be sympathetic to their situation. A 
whip, by definition, would be less willing to forgive and forget.
Parliamentarians as representatives
Parliamentarians have other duties beyond the formal needs of supporting 
their party in the chamber. An incident in early 1996 illustrated the control 
that the whips exercise on the extra-parliamentary role o f deputies. A 
television programme, The Late Late Show, had invited every TD to 
participate in a  cstate-of-the-nation’ debate. However the Oireachtas 
Committee on Procedures and Privileges decided that the debate would be 
wholly inappropriate. Consequently party whips agreed to rein in all their TDs 
and make the studio a no-go area after dark (The Irish Times, 26 January 
1996).
75
The Constitution o f Ireland allows for the election of a  President as head of 
state but with little executive or political authority. To be a candidate however 
requires the nomination o f at least 20 TDs or four local authorities. Clearly 
therefore TDs have a crucial role in the nomination process and their inability 
to act independently o f the party leadership in this regard came to the fore in 
mid 1997. While the larger political parties sought suitable candidates to run 
for the post an individual without any party-political affiliation declared her 
interest in running (The Irish Times, 7 August 1997). To her apparent 
surprise, and the surprise o f many others, she could not obtain a nomination 
from among Dail Deputies . Her supporters along with commentators 
criticised the nomination process on two fronts. Firstly they argued that the 
process should be made more open by the use o f popular primaries (as 
discussed by the Constitutional Review Group) and more interestingly 
claimed that the whip system operating in the Dail ensured a completely 
undemocratic situation where the reality o f the situation was that three people 
(the leaders o f the largest three parties) decide who would be a candidate. 
This arises because o f their tight control of their deputies. One political
7 She was successful in becoming a candidate when she won the support of four Local 
Authorities. At the time of writing confusion existed as lo whether two of these nominations 
were valid. Interestingly if they are deemed invalid the Fianna Fail General Secretary indicated 
that, as the party had since nominated an official candidate, the whip may be applied to 
councillors requiring them not to support the nomination of any non-party candidate. Earlier 
the party councillors in Galway refused to support the nomination of an independent, M r Derek 
Nally (The Irish Times, 20 September 1997).
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scientist even went so far as to suggest that when it came to nominating 
candidates for the office o f president the whip should be removed .8
3.5 S U M M A R Y
The small amount of literature on discipline in Irish politics concludes that 
members o f Irish parliamentary parties are highly disciplined. Leading 
commentators have provided varying reasons for this level o f conformity. 
Some have focused on the prevailing political culture while others have noted 
the importance o f the parties to the re-election prospects o f incumbent TDs.
W hat is clear is that the main parties play close attention to the need for 
discipline and this is reflected at all levels o f the party from ordinary 
membership to membership o f the parliamentary party. Each o f the main 
parties, for example, require members to take an oath o f loyalty. Within the 
parliamentary party the party whip is a well established office whose main 
concern is the ordered running o f party business in the Dail and Seanad - a 
key aspect o f which is ensuring attendance and voting by party TDs. The 
origin o f the system in Irish politics can be traced back to the activities o f the 
Parnellite Party in the British House o f Commons. As we have seen the whips 
exercise influence over all aspects o f a TD ’s parliamentary role from voting 
on motions and legislation to other powers such as selecting candidates for
8 The comment was made by Michael Laver, Professor of Politics at the University of Dublin,
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the office of the President of Ireland. The high level of involvement must lead 
to the conclusion that the whip influences most if not all formal decisions that 
a T D  may be expected to make.
Trinity College during the Saturday View programme transmitted on RTE Radio One (16 
August 1997)
CHAP T ER FOUR
R E B E L L I O N  A N D  R E B E L S
4.1 IN T R O D U C T IO N
Despite the findings in Chapter two that Irish parliamentary parties enjoyed 
100 per cent voting cohesion during 1996 it would be wrong to suggest that 
absolute discipline always occurs or that parliamentarians always act in the 
parliamentary arena as predetermined by the party leadership. The results of 
our investigation o f cases o f  indiscipline since 1970 are reported in this 
chapter. Based on these cases the chapter seeks to explore the causes, nature 
and consequence o f indiscipline. Key questions such as who were the rebels, 
why did they rebel and what, if  anything, happened to them as a consequence 
o f their in-discipline are put forward. We begin with a brief discussion o f the 
research methodology employed in obtaining our cases.
4.2 P A R A M E T E R S  O F T H E  S T U D Y
This chapter reproduces information on cases o f indiscipline which occurred 
in Irish political parties since 1970. Potentially two ways existed to obtain our 
data. We could have analysed the entire voting behaviour o f TDs as recorded 
in the officiai Dâil Debates for the period covered in the study. However this 
would have been excessively time consuming as it required matching party
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membership information to voting behaviour for every deputy for every single 
vote. This would have been necessary as in the past some deputies have 
crossed the house, leaving one party to join another. A more fundamental 
problem with such an approach is the fact that, as already noted in chapter 
two, no information is available on pairing. This would make it impossible to 
determine whether non-voting by a deputy was an act o f  indiscipline or the 
consequence o f a legitimate party pair or another form o f excused absence.
The alternative method is to examine archival news material to obtain the 
cases o f indiscipline. In countries where discipline is not very high in 
parliamentary parties it is unlikely that a revolt by one or even a few 
backbench parliamentarians would be worthy o f mention in the national 
media. However, as we have seen, in Ireland the occurrence o f rebellions or 
even threats to rebel are infrequent to say the least and when they happen they 
frequently make for front page coverage.
When Tony Killeen voted against his Fianna Fail party his constituency 
colleague, Sile De Valera, resigned the whip in support o f  their concerns at 
party policy on the status o f Shannon airport both received attention from the 
national media for several days. Killeen was even pictured on the front page 
of The Irish Times ‘being raised shoulder-high by workers and supporters’ on 
his returning to his constituency after having voted against the Government 
(The Irish Times, 9 July 1993). Likewise for De Valera The Sunday Tribune
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ran a 1,800 word profile o f the TD with the headline ‘marching to the beat o f 
her own drum ’, and all as a result o f her falling out with the party (Sunday 
Tribune, 18 July 1993).
Consequently identifying dissenters can be a matter o f examining national 
newspapers. Given the workload the time period was limited to between 1970 
and the end o f the 27th Dail in May 1997. The former date was selected as it 
is seen as the end o f one era and the beginning o f another, most notably with 
the change of party leadership in Fianna Fail and the resulting decline in the 
relevance o f civil war politics.
Therefore it is hoped that the data collected are reliable in terms o f having 
captured most cases of indiscipline1. At the least we can examine the ones 
which we have successfully obtained and work on the basis that the cases 
collected are an unbiased sample o f the entire population. However we can 
also be confident that based on the reporting practices o f the newspapers and 
the hopefully low human error in identifying the news reports that our data 
cover approximately all cases o f indiscipline.
1 We have included cases of indiscipline related to members of the Senate in this section on the 
basis lhat the provide further examples of ‘inappropriate’ behaviour for parliamentary party 
members.
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4.3 C ASE S T U D IE S  O F IN D IS C IP L IN E
21 April 19702: A motion to expel Stephen Coughlan, TD for Limerick East, 
from the Parliamentary Labour Party is overwhelmingly defeated. Deputy 
Coughlan faced the wrath o f  those protesting at his alleged and well 
documented anti-Semitic remarks. Attempts at the National Executive and 
Annual Conference to have him expelled from the party also failed. W hat this 
case illustrates is the difficulty and unwillingness o f the Labour party, at 
various levels from leadership to grassroots, to remove members, especially 
when they were elected representatives.
4 June 1970: Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party withdraws the whip from Kevin 
Boland, TD and former Minister for Local Government. In May Charles 
Haughey (then Minister for Finance) and Neil Blaney (then Minister for 
Agriculture) were asked to resign as ministers by the Taoiseach Jack Lynch. 
At that time Boland resigned as minister in protest at the treatment o f the two 
ministers. In June, following the arrest o f Haughey and Blaney for alleged 
gun-running, Boland accused Lynch o f ‘felon setting’ and demanded a 
special Party conference, the aim o f which was to remove Lynch from the 
party leadership. The motion to expel Boland was accepted in a secret ballot 
by a margin o f 60 votes to 11 with one apparent abstention. On Monday 22 
June the party National Executive met and it was announced that, in the 
interest o f party unity, Kevin Boland had resigned his membership o f the
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party. Following much speculation he later resigns his seat in the Dail. On 19 
September 1971 he founded Aontacht Eireann, the new Republican Unity 
Party, and was joined in doing so by another Fianna Fail TD, Sean Sherwin. 
Consequently the actions o f the party leadership in disciplining Boland 
resulted in the loss o f two deputies to the party.
28 April 1971: The Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party unanimously withdraws 
the party whip from Joseph Leneghan who had voted against the Government 
in an opposition motion urging that the controversial ‘dole’ order be annulled 
The opposition motion called on the Minister for Social W elfare to reverse an 
order he had made which cancelled unemployment benefit for six months to 
all single rural workers who were hitherto entitled to it. A number o f Fianna 
Fail TDs from rural constituencies expressed annoyance at the Government 
decision. In the chamber Des Foley, the Fianna Fail TD for North County 
Dublin made a speech denouncing the Government but he abstained in the 
division. It appeared that a number o f other Fianna Fail TDs also abstained. 
The Minister for Lands, Sean Flanagan was said to be unavailable to vote 
because he was at a function; however it was reported that he was actually 
seen in the precincts o f Leinster House around the time o f the division.
Chubb O ’Connor, a Fianna Fail TD for Kerry was reported to have left the 
chamber abruptly after the speech by the Minister for Social Welfare, thus
2 Except where otherwise stated the source of each case is The Irish Times of the day following 
the date of the story.
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avoiding the vote. Neither Mick Moran or Des Foley voted despite the fact 
that, like the other Fianna Fail TDs, none had a ‘pairing’ arrangement. Only 
Joseph Leneghan was disciplined. Leneghan’s previous political affiliations 
were with Fine Gael, independent, independent Fianna Fail and eventually 
Fianna Fail. Before his expulsion he was quoted in The Irish Times o f 27 
April 1971 as saying ‘I am not worried about it and I w on’t get gray hairs. I 
suppose I will probably be put out o f the party, but, on the other hand, they 
didn’t put me out when I went in as an independent and kept them in office. 
They were very nice to me then. ’
The newspaper also reported that after the vote and while still in the chamber 
the Government C hief Whip, David Andrews, pointed to M r Leneghan and 
called him ‘a traitor’. In The Irish Times o f 23 April, its leading political 
commentator, John Healy, declared that by his actions Leneghan has ‘thus 
made him self the second deputy to get into the 20th [next] Dail, the first 
being the Ceann Comhairle who is automatically returned.’ Clearly the 
implication was that a deputy who puts constituents before party would be 
treated as a local hero and would thus be able to depend on greater support in 
any future election. Flowever, despite being nominated as one o f the official 
party candidates at the following election, he lost his seat.
10 November 1971: Neil Blaney and Paudge Brennan abstain in a division on 
a motion of no confidence in the Minister for Agriculture, Jim Gibbons. The
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two were expelled exactly one week later by the Fianna Fail Parliamentary 
Party.
9 February 1972: John Brown and John O ’Connell, two Labour 
backbenchers introduce a Private M em bers’ Bill which would liberalise the 
law on contraception and birth control facilities. The Bill was opposed by 
three o f their fellow members o f the Parliamentary Labour Party (Stephen 
Coughlan, Michael Pat Murphy and Dan Spring), all o f  the Fianna Fail Party 
and eight Fine Gael TDs. The issue was one o f the few in the history o f the 
state to cause such internal division in each o f the main parties. Attempts to 
have the three Labour deputies dropped from the Parliamentary Party failed 
when at the 1972 Annual Conference delegates voted not to discuss an 
emergency motion calling for them to be expelled. However as a result o f the 
whole debacle the parliamentary party established a sub-committee to 
consider the issue o f discipline and make recommendations about introducing 
formal rules to cover unauthorised voting in the Dail and Seanad.
2 December 1972: The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill is 
passed by the Dail. The Fianna Fail Government has the backing o f a number 
o f Fine Gael TDs (including its leader Liam Cosgrave) but is not supported 
by some dissenting Government backbenchers. The Bill came one day after 
two bombs in Dublin killed two and injured 127, This incident was important 
in that it reinforced certain members’ reluctance simply to adhere to their
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party line. Consequently we experienced the unusual sight o f a Government 
failing to carry all their backbenchers with them while being backed by some 
opposition members, most notable the leader o f the main opposition party. On 
11 December 1972 Paudge Brennan and Des Foley are expelled from the 
Parliamentary Party for voting against the whip on The Offences Against the 
State (Amendment) Bill.
16 July 1974: Following the 1973 case o f M cG ee  v A ttorn ey  G enera l in the 
Supreme Court, which enumerated a constitutional right for married couples 
to import contraceptive devices for their personal use, the Government 
introduce a bill which would have allowed contraceptives to be imported and 
sold, under license, by chemists to married couples. As some TDs seemingly 
claimed conscientious objections to the idea o f legislating for artificial and 
unnatural contraception, something which would clearly be against the 
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church (Gallagher, 1982, p. 202) the 
Government parties (Fine Gael, Labour) allowed their members a free vote. 
Commentators and politicians are shocked when, without any warning to his 
colleagues, the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave votes against the bill which his 
cabinet had introduced.
Gallagher (1982, p. 202) notes that the Toaiseach was joined by Richard 
Burke (the Fine Gael Minister for Education) and five Fine Gael 
backbenchers in the opposition lobby ensuring the defeat o f their own
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Government’s Bill for the Control o f the Importation, Sale and Manufacture 
o f Contraceptive, by 75 votes to 61. One Labour Party TD, Dan Spring, used 
the right to abstain to show his annoyance at his party leadership over his 
recent demotion within the organisation. The incident is probably one o f the 
most bizarre breaches o f the concept o f cabinet Government and collective 
responsibility .3
April 1975: Labour Senator and General Secretary o f the Irish Transport and 
General Workers Union, Mr. Michael Mullen, votes against the Government 
on the first reading of the Criminal Law Jurisdiction Bill. The Bill, which was 
staunchly opposed by Fianna Fail, allowed for terrorist suspects to be tried in 
the Republic for crimes committed in other jurisdictions, including Northern 
Ireland.
Gallagher (1982, p. 202) informs us that as a consequence o f M ullen’s action 
the Parliamentary Labour Party amended its rules so that, thereafter, any 
member o f the parliamentary party who failed to support the Government 
would be deemed to have automatically relinquished the party whip. The only 
exceptions would be where the parliamentary party did not support the 
Government motion or where the Government allowed a free vote. As a
3 The principle of collective cabinet responsibility is enshrined in Article 28.4.2 o f the 1937 
Constitution; The Government shall meet and act as a collective authority, and shall be 
collectively responsible for the Departments of State administered by the members of the 
Government. The Cabinet Confidentiality case of 1992, A ttorney General v Hamilton, 
reinforced the importance of the principle as a central feature of the Irish political system 
(Hogan, 1993). Farrell (1997, p. 51, n2) has noted that where a minister (and consequently
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consequence, when Mullen voted against the Criminal law Jurisdiction Bill 
on its final reading, he forfeited the whip. Having prior knowledge o f the 
consequences o f his action Mullen claimed that he would ‘do the honourable 
thing’ and resign his seat in the Seanad. However this never happened and he 
was re-admitted to the Parliamentary Party on the 16th February 1977.
22 January 1976: Dr. John O ’Connell, a Labour backbench TD puts down an 
amendment to his own Government’s Criminal Law Jurisdiction Bill. 
However in the division he abstained so as to avoid automatic expulsion from 
the parliamentary party. The idea o f tabling a motion but then being unable to 
support it because o f party rules is an interesting example o f TDs attempting 
to exercise influence without stepping over boundaries and facing 
recrimination.
28 April 1976: The Parliamentary Labour Party decides to expel Dr David 
Thornley because he appeared on a Provisional Sinn Fein platform during a 
prohibited Easter Rising commemoration ceremony. The vote at the meeting 
was twenty two for the motion and three against. The whip was restored the 
following February.
20 September 1977: Dr. Conor Cruise O ’Brien resigns as a member o f the 
Parliamentary Labour Party because o f conflict with the leader o f  the party,
Taoiseach) cannot accept cabinet policy they are expected to resign, although some isolated 
examples of such non-conformity had occurred in the 1920s.
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Frank Cluskey, over his contributions to the debate on Northern Ireland at a 
conference in Oxford on 18 September where he claimed that a majority of 
people in Ireland do not want Irish unity. It was believed that had he not 
resigned Crusie O ’Brien would have faced a motion of expulsion on the basis 
that he put him self in open conflict with the party position.
29 September 1977: The Administrative Council o f the Labour Party decides 
that Dr Noel Browne and Matt Merrigan have ceased to be members of the 
party because they contested the election on behalf o f a  separate political 
party with its own election manifesto and organisation. They had done so 
while still being paper members o f the Labour Party.
January 20 1982: Charles McCreevy is expelled from Fianna Fail because of 
his public criticisms o f the party leader. Despite being a one time close friend 
and ally o f the leader, McCreevey had become disillusioned with the party 
policy on the economy and gave an interview to a Sunday newspaper (The 
Sunday Tribune) to that effect (Collins, 1992). In October o f the same year 
McCreevy unsuccessfully tabled a motion of no confidence in Charles 
Haughey as party leader.
25 January 1983: The Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party establish a sub­
committee to investigate the telephone tapping controversies and the role 
played by Sean Doherty, the front bench spokesman on Justice. The former
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Minister o f Justice and Fianna Fail TD for Roscommon is eventually forced 
to resign from the Parliamentary Party following disclosure o f  the news that 
he authorised the tapping o f the phones o f two journalists in 1982. He was 
reinstated by Charles Haughey and the Parliamentary Party towards the end of 
1984 and went on to top the poll in the following general election in his 
constituency. Earlier in the same month Martin O ’Donoghue resigned from 
the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party. On January 16 the Parliamentary Party is 
also forced to denounce the recording o f telephone conversations between 
O ’Donoghue and Raymond MacSharry.
26 April 1983: The Fine Gael Parliamentary Party agree that because eight o f 
its deputies have conscientious objections disciplinary action would not be 
taken against members who will not support the Fine Gael motion on 
Wednesday 27 April in the Dail regarding a wording to amend the 
constitution aimed at prohibiting abortion. On the day eight deputies cross the 
floor and vote with Fianna Fail. They are Oliver J Flanagan, Tom O ’Donnell, 
Alice Glenn, Liam T. Cosgrave, Michael J. Cosgrave, Michael Begley, 
Godfrey Timmons and Joe Doyle. Labour members also split on the issue.
26 March 1985: Desmond O ’Malley, TD and former Government minister, is 
expelled from the Fianna Fail Party by 73 votes to nine because o f his 
frequent public criticisms of the party leader. O ’Malley objected to the lack o f 
discussion on party policy, most especially on the New Ireland Forum Report
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of 1984, both inside and outside the parliamentary party. He criticised the way 
debate within the parliamentary party had been stifled by the party leader ( 
Dwyer, 1992, p. 126-127). He says he will consider forming a new political 
party.
21 November 1985: The Dâil approves the Anglo Irish Agreement. Mary 
Harney is expelled from the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party a week later for 
voting with the Government and against the party. Harney joins Desmond 
O ’Malley in founding a new political party.
18 December 1986: Liam Skelly, a Dublin W est Fine Gael TD, threatens to 
withdraw his support for the Government unless it approved a £200 million 
transport development plan for Dublin (the Skelly Caneire plan). In February 
1987 the local party organisation de-selected him as a party candidate.
26 November 1986: Michael O ’Leary threatens to abstain in a vote on the 
Governments decision to cut £3 million off Christmas bonuses on social 
welfare payments. He does not however follow through on his threat.
30 November 1986: Fine Gael TD Brendan McGahon threatens to withdraw 
support for his party unless they sanction a package o f aid for the border 
counties. He failed to secure re-selection by the local party organisation in the 
winter o f 1996. Although he continued to be seen as somewhat o f a maverick
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he is added to the ticket by the National Executive o f  Fine Gael. The case 
illustrates the dependence that the national party have on individual members 
to get re-elected where the outcome o f the general election is seen as being 
very close and every single seat could be the difference between being in or 
out o f  power.
19 December 1986: Oliver J. Flanagan told the Government chief whip ‘you 
can depend on my vote for ordinary legislation and financial matters, but on 
moral issues God cracks the w hip’. In 1983 he campaigned for the pro-life 
amendment to the constitution and called Garret FitzGerald a Herod. He 
opposed the Government family planning bill and campaigned against the 
introduction o f divorce. He was for a brief period Minister for Defence and 
represented the constituency o f Laois-Offaly for 43 years. He stood down at 
the 1987 election. His comments were made after he was forced to travel 
from his hospital bed to support the Government in the division on the 
Christmas adjournment debate.
10 December 1986: Alice Glenn resigns from the Fine Gael Parliamentary 
Party over controversy caused by her ‘enemy o f the people’ remarks. She had 
stated that Protestant clergymen who opposed the introduction o f divorce 
(which was party policy) should be considered enemies o f the state. On 28 
November she failed to get re-selected by the local party organisation. The 
party leader, Dr. FitzGerald, had placed a motion to have the whip removed
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from her before the parliamentary party despite the fact that the Government 
majority in the Dâil depended on her support.
14 December 1988: Willie O ’Dea, the Minister for State and Fianna Fail TD 
for Limerick East, is expelled from the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party after 
having failed to support his minority government on a motion regarding the 
closure o f Barringtons Hospital in his constituency. The government was 
defeated on the motion and O ’Dea was removed as a junior member of the 
government. In April 1989 the whip was restored by the parliamentary party. 
In the following election the TD topped the poll and on the appointment of 
Albert Reynolds as the new party leader he returned to the front bench as a 
junior spokesman on justice.
14 March 1989: The Labour Party amend their constitution to make it easier 
for the national organisation to expel Militants. Soon afterwards five ordinary 
members, including Joe Higgins, were expelled for apparently writing articles 
in the M ilitan t newspaper. Higgins was elected as a deputy in the 1997 
general election as a member o f the Socialist Party.
24 July 1989: Jackie Fahey TD resigns the Fianna Fail whip and says he will 
sit as an independent in protest at M r Haugheys’ decision to enter a coalition 
with the Progressive Democrats. The local party organisation in Waterford 
are amongst the most vociferous opponents o f the change o f policy and
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openly condemn it and their representatives for supporting it. Records suggest 
that Fahey continued supporting the party in Dail votes although he was later 
expelled from the parliamentary party.
19 May 1992: Two Labour Party TDs, Michael D. Higgins (Galway West), 
the party spokesperson on Foreign Affairs, and Emmit Stagg (Kildare), make 
known their opposition to the M aastricht Treaty on European Union. This 
was despite official Labour Party policy being in favour o f a yes vote in the 
referendum. As there is no division on the subject in the Dail their voting 
behaviour is not tested. In an interview Mr Stagg said that he would have 
voted along party lines.
20 May 1992: Senator Des Hanafan, the arch conservative and leader of the 
so called pro-life and anti-divorce movements is expelled from the Fianna 
Fail Parliamentary Party for voting against the party in the Seanad on the 
motion to allow for a referendum to ratify the Treaty on European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty). Many believed that the treaty would encapsulate into 
Irish law the possibility o f abortion being legal in the Republic because o f the 
Supreme Court decision in the x  case  and the protocol in the treaty 
reaffirming the article o f the constitution upon which the pro-choice decision 
o f the court was made. Hanafan was said to have received a lot o f support at 
the Parliamentary Party meeting, much to the annoyance o f the party 
leadership.
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7 July 1993: Tony Killeen, a Fianna Fail TD for Clare, votes against the 
Government on the issue o f the removal o f the compulsory Shannon stop­
over for all transatlantic flights to and from the Republic. He also resigns the 
party whip in protest.
Sile de Valera, K illeens’ fellow Fianna Fail TD in Clare, and now a front 
bench spokesperson, also resigns the party whip. She is out o f the country and 
thus paired for the vote in the Dail and has to show her annoyance with party 
policy by resigning the whip by fax. Both Killeen and de Valera are supported 
by the local party organisation and by all 17 Fianna Fail public representatives 
on Clare County Council, who also resign the party whip in protest at 
Government policy. Only in December 1993 is harmony restored between the 
party in Dublin and Clare.
This case also illustrates in two ways the intra-party rivalry to represent local 
interests. Firstly we can speculate that de Valera felt obliged to resign her seat 
after her party colleague had done so. Secondly at the subsequent general 
election in 1997 The Clare Champion ( 6 June 1997) reported a ‘Dogfight’ 
between the three Fianna Fail candidates over the issue o f the Shannon vote. 
Senator Brendan Daly had distributed a letter in which he claimed credit for 
the further development o f the airport. Deputy Killeen ‘reminded’ Senator 
Killeen that he had refused to ‘walk the plank’ back in 1993.
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29 June 1994: Four Labour Party deputies from north Dublin refuse to take 
the party and Government whip. Sean Ryan (Dublin North) and Tommy 
Broughan (Dublin North East) vote against the party on the opposition 
motion regarding Government policy on Team Air Lingus. Two others, Joe 
Costello (Dublin Central) and Sean Kenny (Dublin North East) abstain in the 
same vote. The four deputies lose the party whip and have a number o f party- 
related privileges, such as the use of party research facilities and the party 
press office, withdrawn by the party leadership.
6 April 1995: Paddy Harte, the Fine Gael deputy for Donegal North East and 
former junior minister and front bench spokesperson, is expelled from the 
Fine Gael Parliamentary Party. He is expelled for failing to support the 
Government on the Abortion Information Bill 1995. At time o f expulsion it 
was clear that he could expect to be re-admitted ‘with open arm s’ within six 
months, according to Phil Hogan TD. Harte was said to be totally unrepentant 
over his voting behaviour. Some Fine Gael TDs attending the Parliamentary 
Party meeting were said to have called for a conscience clause for members 
who had difficulty voting on social or moral issues.
Many felt shame that a man o f his experience should be removed that way. 
However the Taoiseach noted that in order for cohesion to be maintained in 
Government there must be discipline and all Government TDs are expected to
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vote for Government legislation. The motion to expel was made by the party 
leader and seconded by Sean Barrett in his capacity as chief whip Four 
members o f the Parliamentary Party, Brendan M cGahon, Ted Nealon, Dinny 
McGinley and Shane Ross, all supported Paddy Flarte. In all 45 members 
voted in favour o f the leaderships motion. Harte lost his seat at the 1997 
election.
3 October 1995: Michael J Noonan (FF, Limerick) who first entered the Dail 
in 1969 and served as a junior and cabinet minister votes against the 
Government in the vote to allow for a referendum on the issue o f divorce 
(Divorce Referendum Bill) which was backed by opposition parties including 
Fianna Fail. The party whip is withdrawn.
8 November 1995: In the Seanad the Government lose an important vote due 
to the unexcused absence o f some senators from the Government party. Each 
of the Senators have certain privileges withdrawn for the remainder o f the 
session as punishment. The Government whip in the Seanad is rebuked for 
his mismanagement by the Taoiseach.
11 June 1996: The Governments Transport (Dublin Light Rail) No. 1 Bill 
1996 is defeated at its second stage reading. It was re-introduced, without 
amendment, on 18 June. Bertie Ahern, the leader o f the opposition, claimed it 
was the first defeat o f a Government bill, other than in 1976 when a free vote
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was allowed. The reason for the defeat was that six TDs were absent without 
pairing: Moosajee Bhamjee, Derek McDowell, John Mulvihill, Jim Kemmy, 
Joe Costello and Peter Barry. Bhamjee claimed he was feeling unwell, and 
Costello and McDowell claimed they did not know about the vote. Labour 
Party whip, Brian Fitzgerald, gave the five Labour deputies a verbal 
reprimand. As punishment the Government C hief W hip announced that the 
six would not be facilitated for the remainder o f the session. As The Irish  
Times commented, the fact that everyone was shocked at the defeat o f a 
Government bill shows the extent to which the Dail has become a mere 
rubber stamp.
26 March 1997: Fianna Fail provides pairs for three Government Senators 
(Jim Townsend, Mary Kelly and Dino Cregan). However six rather than three 
Senators were absent - they were Michael Finneran, Ed Haughey, Rory Kiely 
(paired), M ick Lanagan (paired), Paddy McGowan (paired) and Michael 
O ’Kennedy. Finneran was late for the vote. No comment was made by the FF 
whips in the Seanad (Tom Fitzgerald and Brian Mullooly) or by the leader of 
the house G  V Wright. The Government won the vote 27 to 23. (The 
Phoenix, 11 April 1997, p. 4). This case shows the continuous pressure 
placed on whips to ensure members are present as required - and the 
consequences o f not having the numbers. Even members o f the Dail as we 
have seen forget to turn up. A more recent example was provided when Brian 
Lenihan (jnr) who is a Fianna Fail TD failed to show for a vote on the order
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of business on the last day o f Dail business before the 1997 summer recess. 
The position o f the Government, having to rely on support o f non-affiliated 
members, ensured Lenihan’s absence won him a rebuke from the party whip 
(Magill, September 1997, p. 60).
6 March 1997: Michael Lowry, who was forced to resign as Minister for 
Transport, Energy and Communication in November 1996, resigns from Fine 
Gael, following allegations o f financial and tax irregularities. The leader o f 
the party, John Bruton, informed M r Lowry that his re-selection as an official 
party candidate for the forthcoming 1997 election would be blocked by the 
National Executive as his tax affairs were not in order.
In making the decision to block any attempt at re-selection the party were 
aware that Lowry would probably stand as an independent and due to his high 
level o f popular support in his constituency o f North Tipperary the party 
risked loosing a seat. The decision some weeks later by Lowry to contest the 
election as an independent split the constituency party with many Fine Gael 
activists backing the independent TD. In the election Lowry received 
increased support and was elected far ahead o f any other candidate. The Fine 
Gael candidate failed to get elected.
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4.4 ISSUES A N D  P O N D E R A B LE S
A cursory glance at the cases will immediately reveal that from time to time 
parliamentarians have been willing to openly rebel against their party. W hat is 
also clear is that they are willing to take advantage o f more than one method, 
formally voting against the wishes o f the party in parliament, to express their 
annoyance or disapproval at something the party did or was about to do. 
Likewise we can observe a willingness on the side o f party leaders to 
discipline members for offences not related to their voting record.
H ow  d id  they reb e l ?
Our study identified 13 cases o f indiscipline involving parliamentary party 
members actually voting against their party in Dail or Seanad votes and being 
expelled for doing so. But this o f course is not the complete story. There were 
circumstances where a deputy could expect to break the whip without being 
expelled
Other popular forms of rebellion which exist in Irish politics include making 
public criticism of the party leader or party policy. This angers the party and is 
seen as being equivalent to rebellion because members are meant to express 
their personal opinions inside the parliamentary party and thereafter to accept 
the high level of collective responsibility. This strict line with backbenchers,
Re-defining discipline
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where any public comments against the official party position resulted in 
retribution, seems to have been severe under the leadership o f Charles 
Haughey in Fianna Fail with two prominent TDs (Charles McCreevey and 
Desmond O ’Malley) paying a heavy price for open criticism o f party policy. 
The former was expelled for a time from the parliamentary party and certainly 
seemed to have his career put on hold until the arrival o f a new leader, while 
the latter was expelled from the party.
Why did they rebel?
An interesting question to ask is what were the issues that caused the 
rebellion? Our first approach was to define each issue as being either of 
national importance (an issue o f public policy) or local importance (an issue 
o f constituent representation) to the TD. Obviously it is difficult to quantify 
some causes. For example was the case o f Joseph Leneghan who rebelled 
over the issue o f dole payments a policy issue or a constituency issue ? On 
one hand this could be seen as a national issue while on the other it could be 
seen as a local issue in so much as it may have adversely disadvantaged some 
of his constituents. On other issues (examining parliamentary questions) 
authors have tended to define constituent versus national issues by reference 
to the presence or absence o f a specific geographical area in the question 
(Judge, 1974; Raunio, 1996a).
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Our cases show no clear pattern between the two possible distinctions. While 
some have rebelled on local issues others seem concerned with national ones. 
Given the small number o f rebellions it also seems plausible to suggest that 
even where constituency issues give rise to problems for the local TD they are 
still not usually willing to defy the party whip on the issue. Take for example 
the minority Government o f  Charles Haughey between 1987 and 1989. 
During that time the public finances underwent a period o f  contraction with 
severe cutbacks in spending on areas such as health. Many hospitals were 
planned to be closed. The issue was most notable in County Roscommon 
where the failure o f the two local Fianna Fail TDs to ‘break ranks’ resulted in 
the local pro-hospital lobby fielding candidates in the 1987, 1989, 1992 and 
1997 general elections. The 1989 election resulted in the unseating o f a 
Fianna Fail TD and his replacement by the pro-hospital candidate.
Since this dramatic event other TDs seem to have become more alert to the 
need to be seen to be supporting local issues whatever the consequence for 
their career or relationship within the party. Thus in the wake o f the crisis at 
Team Aer Lingus in 1994 the four local Labour Party deputies quickly 
showed their discontent with their Government’s handling o f the situation 
and refused to vote against an opposition motion on the issue.
One o f the most controversial areas where the party whip system has been 
enforced is on issues which relate to moral or religious beliefs such as
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liberalising the availability o f  contraception or amendments to the 
Constitution to deal with moral issues such as abortion or divorce. As we 
have seen many criticise the operation o f whips and expulsions for ignoring 
party lines on matters of ‘conscience’. W hile in the 1980s parties accepted the 
right o f members to vote as they wished on issues o f morality and conscience, 
recent Governments have been unwilling to accept the right o f deputies to 
exercise the conscience vote. Thus in 1995 two senior politicians, Paddy 
Harte in Fine Gael and Michael J Noonan in Fianna Fail were expelled from 
the parliamentary party for not backing their respective party’s position.
Outside o f Dail voting the practice in Fianna Fail has been to instruct 
members that they are free to campaign on moral issues within their own
constituency but they must still follow the guidance o f the parliamentary party
^  1 .
in Dail votes. ‘'ytr '
W hat h appen ed  to the d issen ters?
On the face o f it our cases suggest that it is not necessarily a grave experience 
for deputies who are expelled from their parliamentary party. Even in the 
worst case scenario o f being de-selected at the next general election a sitting 
TD seems to have a good opportunity to gain re-election as an independent. 
Michael Lowry, who resigned from Fine Gael after the party leader indicated 
that his nomination as a candidate would be opposed by party headquarters,
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actually increased his share o f the vote in his constituency and was 
comfortably re-elected.
The norm is to expel deputies for a short period o f time and then welcome 
them back with open arms. Most if  not all TD who have been forced to 
relinquish the party whip have, where they have wanted to, been allowed 
back into the parliamentary party fold within a matter o f months. This leads to 
the conclusion that suspension is really not a great problem, especially when 
we consider the free publicity and probable good-will which the individual 
will receive as a result o f standing his or her ground.
O f course it could be argued that losing the whip for a short time is the least 
o f the disadvantages incurred by a rebellious TD. Rather those TDs could be 
sent out into the political wilderness never to hold any important party post 
from that day forward. Neither, it may be suggested, would they ever be 
promoted to important Government committees or even to junior ranks within 
Government or the frontbench because o f their track record o f disloyalty. The 
evidence suggests that it is difficult to posit a causal relationship between 
promotion possibilities and life long compliance o f the whip. Certainly if 
someone is a continuous source o f annoyance to the party elite a promotion 
ought not be expected. But the case o f Sile de Valera proves that you can 
speak out against the party leadership, resign the whip in protest, and still 
hope to be a Government minister in a few years time.
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This chapter has provided evidence of cases o f indiscipline in Irish 
parliamentary parties. It serves to highlight the fact that even in tightly 
controlled parties indiscipline will still occur. The cases listed highlight the 
fact that although parties are indeed highly disciplined creatures 
parliamentarians do occasionally find the need to break free and openly revolt 
against party policy on certain issues.
Furthermore this revolt may take one o f many forms ranging from ‘off the 
record’ conversations with the media, giving full interviews, making but not 
voting for amendments to party policy in the chamber to actually voting 
against the party in the Dail or Seanad.
We have also seen the willingness o f the party leadership to challenge such 
revolts and their willingness to deal with other matters which bring the party 
into disrepute or for actions not in the best interest o f the party in a similar 
way
4.5 SUM M ARY
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CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARDS A FORMAL MODEL OF
B E H A V I O U R
5.1 IN T R O D U C T IO N
This chapter attempts to build on the empirical evidence provided in chapters 
two, three and four. The aim is to explain party discipline, the phenomenon 
which we have been observing in Irish parliamentary parties. Chapter one 
provided comparative accounts o f discipline in other countries and this 
chapter also seeks to build on this work. As will become clear our analysis is 
built upon the assumptions o f  the rational choice school. Consequently we 
begin with an overview of this approach and its use in political science. We 
then develop a formal model o f legislative intra-party behaviour to explain 
party discipline. W e seek to apply our theoretical model to the case o f Irish 
parliamentary parties by examining the coherent logic o f the model with 
specific reference to the workings o f the Irish political system. This is 
primarily based on an examination o f the power o f party elites and the 
environmental influences, such as the electoral system, on the behaviour o f 
politicians in the parliamentary arena. The chapter concludes with a brief 
examination o f how incorporating elements o f structural-institutional 
explanations o f political behaviour into the classical rational choice model 
can improve our understanding o f discipline. We begin however with a
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overview o f the methodology o f formal analysis and in particular an overview 
o f the basis and assumptions o f rational choice explanations in political 
science.
5.2 T H E  R A T IO N A L  C H O IC E  A P P R O A C H
The aim o f the rational choice approach is to construct formal normative 
models o f behaviour. Although rational choice comes is numerous guises the 
most common varieties are all predicated on the key doctrine that individuals 
seek to maximise their own preferences, desires and interests. Allied to this is 
the assumption that individuals can recognise and order such preferences. 
Faced with a decision rational choice assumes that an individual will choose 
the option that maximises their own wellbeing, or in the jargon o f classical 
micro-economics, their utility. An individual’s actions are therefore seen to 
be based not on any notion o f predetermined socialisation but solely in terms 
o f self-reward and self-interest.
The rational choice approach therefore provides a very distinct way of 
viewing the world. As a methodology it has found applications across many 
disciplines from biology to economics. Within political science rational 
choice has been used in all sub-disciplines and has been applied to many 
issues from understanding the emergence o f new political parties (Hug, 1996)
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to explanations o f nationalism (Olson, 1993).1 N ot unexpectedly such an
approach has found many critics. That criticism has ranged from the school’s
• " 2inability to provide theories that have stood the test o f empirical scrutiny to 
beliefs that the underlying assumptions are flawed.3 W e aim to counter these 
criticisms by following the examples o f recent writers in incorporating 
institutional and non-rational elements into the theory (c.f. Norgaard, 1996).
5.3 A S S U M P T IO N S  O F T H E  M O D E L
Assumptions are the foundations upon which a model is built. Therefore it 
would be careless not to spell out explicitly some o f the major suppositions 
underlying our model. Doing so may be venturesome as many may balk at the 
conjectures being made and immediately cry ‘unrealistic’. My answer (in all 
likelihood really the answers o f others) is that without making assumptions 
and simplifications the community o f social scientists would be able to 
explain very little. Surely it is better to set intelligent parameters to a model 
and attempt to chip away at the unrealistic assumptions at a later stage than 
not to be able to generalise and theorise at all.
1 For two excellent overviews of the use of rational choice in the study of politics see McLean 
(1991) and Ward (1995).
2 The most common criticism is made of rational choice theories of voting. All models predict 
that a rational individual will not vote. Clearly this has no basis in reality although many have 
made great efforts to amend the model to explain away voting as an irrational act. Still one is 
unlikely to find a pure rational choice theorist who will accept that voting is anything but 
irrational (c.f. Mueller, 1989, p. 348-369).
3 In recent years the debate about the validity of rational choice theory and the study of politics 
has been revisited with the publication of a book by two leading critics of the approach (Green 
& Shapiro, 1994) which excited must controversy including responses by some of the leading 
scholars in the field (Friedman, 1996) .
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Indeed to justify the case for assumptions we only have to look at the work of 
others in the profession. Take, for example, one of, if not the most, important 
work on political parties. I refer to Downes’ seminal w ork entitled An  
E conom ic A pproach  To D em o cra cy  (Downes, 1957) whose central thesis 
was the prediction that by constructing a two dimensional map o f party 
systems and identifying a median voter one can predict that all parties should 
move to the centre (the median voter) to maximise electoral support. This 
model despite depending on an almost implausible assumptions about the 
number o f dimensions in party policy and the existence o f  a median voter 
continues to have a profound effect on scholarly thinking and has remained 
essentially unchallenged (although c.f. Gilljam, 1997).
A ssum ption  I: the nature o f  p o litic s
In attempting to model rational behaviour a question needs to be asked 
regarding the basic motivations o f politicians. In this model I draw on the 
assumptions posited by political scientists working on models o f government 
coalitions. As reported by Gallagher et. al. (1996, p.304-306) the literature is 
dominated by two different approaches: the ‘office seeking’ school and the 
‘policy seeking’ school.
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Many assume that politicians are motivated above all else by a desire to hold 
high office. Traditionally this has been applied to and meant membership o f 
government with all the perks and benefits that such an office brings. 
However in this model office seeking refers to two possible and quiet distinct 
arenas. The first arena is the basic post o f member o f parliament. In the case 
of incumbent members this refers to the desire to secure re-election to 
parliament. Indeed it does seem quiet plausible to imply that the primary 
motivation o f politicians is to get re-elected at the next general election.
In the current context office-seeking could also operate in another arena - the 
internal party. Promotion in the internal party to the frontbench (or the cabinet 
for governing parties) and potentially to the leadership of the party (and prime 
ministership for governing parties) is a second prize that politicians can aim 
to achieve by their actions. O f course to succeed in the second they must first 
pass the first by continuing to gain re-election.
policy seeking politicians
An alternative, and somewhat less cynical, view is to assume that politicians 
are interested above all else in making and implementing public policy. 
Certainly this is the most likely reason that incumbent politicians would give 
for entering politics. The assumption has found favour among many theorists 
in political science. De Swaan for example (1973, p.88) notes that
office seeking politicians
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‘considerations o f policy are foremost in the minds o f the actors ... the 
parliamentary game is, in fact, about the determination o f major government 
policy.’
A ssum ption II: inform ation
The degree to which each legislator knows how each o f his or her colleagues 
will act is an important consideration in any model. Our model will make an 
assumption o f perfect information among and between TDs . This seems a 
legitimate approach as most deputies are aware o f the opinions o f each other. 
More importantly the crucial focal point may not be the actual act o f voting 
but the pronouncement in advance o f how one is going to vote. A further 
issues is whether the decision making process is influenced by the dynamic of 
the decisions being made simultaneously. In other words if X and Y are 
considering rebelling and X then decides not to rebel this may impact on the 
subsequent decision o f Y which may impact on the initial decision of X4.
A ssum ption  III: once o f f  o r repea t p la y
Most models start with an analysis o f an interaction which is described as 
‘once-ofP in that the interaction occurs once and only once. Although we 
start with such a situation we will show how to develop the game into a
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repeat play supergame. However the game will not be played infinitely but 
indefinitely5.
5.4 A  M O D E L  O F P A R L IA M E N T A R Y  
D E C IS IO N  M A K IN G
Applying a rational choice theory o f decision making to parliamentarians 
requires us to analyse the costs and benefits of making particular decisions. 
Consequently for each potential action there is a clear associated outcome 
which predetermines the rational choice to be made by the decision maker.
Each time a TD goes to vote in a Dail division he or she is faced with one of 
two options: vote as required by the party (decision A), or vote against the 
wishes o f the party (labelled decision B). We can therefore assume that the 
following formula will be facing each TD each time they attempt to vote:
VA if Uva > Uvb
Where the utility o f voting for A is greater than the utility associated with 
voting for B the rational actor will always choose A. This certainly should not
4 To take account of the non-static nature of many interactions game theoiy models depend on 
bayesian decision theory to allow for common knowledge to be undated at each stage of the 
game (c. f. Osbourne & Rubinstein, 1994, pp. 24-30).
5 A infinite repeat play game is one which is played over and over and never stops. An 
indefinite game is one which is played over and over but will stop at some unknown point in 
the future.
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be considered surprising. We do however need to compute the utility for the 
choices faced by deputies. This is done by reference to the costs and benefits 
associated with such action. Before we do so however we develop our model 
to take account o f the interdependent element o f the decision making process.
5.5 A  M O D E L  O F IN T E R D E P E N D E N T  
D E C IS IO N  M A K IN G
This section introduces an element o f uncertainty into the model to reflect two 
possible situations. Firstly deputies will be influenced by the likely decisions 
o f other deputies in deciding how to act and secondly they will not necessarily 
be aware o f how their colleagues will act.
These factors are, I argue, important because in the real world the situation 
arises where one deputy who is potentially ready to rebel is swayed by what 
other deputies will do. Likewise if one believes in party politics, as surely 
members o f parliamentary parties must, then each must have a concern for 
maintaining the principle of cohesive voting. This would not however prevent 
dissent as long as the dissenting felt their actions would not have 
consequences beyond the immediate vote.
Consequently the motivation o f actors may be similar to a free-riding 
scenario: I will allow myself to defect but others must continue to co-operate
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at all other votes. Let us say for the sake o f simplicity that we have a 
parliamentary system with only two parties, party A and party B. As both 
parties are well-disciplined, usually approximately all the members o f each 
party will be united in opposition to the policies o f the other party. But on all 
issues at least a small minority o f members would like to oppose the policy of 
their own party. The parliament is composed o f Party A with 101 
representatives and Party B with 99 representatives (therefore party A forms 
the government with a working majority o f 2). N ow  let us say that on every 
issue to be decided Party B will oppose party A and vice versa.
On every issue, two members o f Party A will oppose that particular issue and 
only that issue and on every other issue they will be in full and absolute 
agreement with the majority of their party. Furthermore we know that in the 
lifetime o f the parliament 100 decisions will be made.
At each vote in parliament MPs who are personally opposed to their party on 
a particular issue must choose between two options:
1. vote with the opposition, defeating the particular policy o f their own party 
but voting and achieving a utility o f +10, or
2 . vote with their own party and disregard their own opinions and achieving 
a utility o f -10
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Figure 5.1: decision tree  facing parliam en tarian  w ith once-off voting
vote with opposition (+10)
Decision theory would suggest that the rational action is for the player to vote 
with the opposition because in this particular game he or she achieves their 
desired outcome (the bill is defeated).
However an important point which we must take into account is that voting 
in a legislature is not a once-off game, rather it is repeated over and over 
again. In our example 100 votes will be taken during the period. The 
consequences o f someone voting against their party therefore has 
repercussions further down the line as it may help to establish the 
acceptability o f indiscipline within the party. I f  this were the case the 
consequences o f voting against your own party would not just be to have this 
particular issue defeated as you want but to have all other 99 issues defeated 
as on no issue could the party be sure o f a legislative majority.
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Thus when we consider the long-term effects o f a player being disloyal the 
utility attached to each alternative for the player changes remarkably:
1. vote with opposition, defeating this particular bill (+10) but establishing a 
norm whereby it is socially acceptable for a parliamentarian to vote against 
his party thus ensuring your party will never have a working legislative 
majority and consequently the other 99 issues which you support will fail (- 
990 comprising 99 issues at -10 utils per issue) giving a utility o f -980, or
2 . vote with party, ensuring the particular policy to which you were opposed 
is passed (-10) but ensuring that the social norm of party loyalty is 
maintained ensuring that on the other 99 issues with which you agree the 
party will have the necessary majority to secure its approval (+990) giving 
a utility o f +980.
Figure 5.2: decision tree facing a parliamentarian with repeated voting
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Thus the decision tree is altered dramatically when we take a longer term 
view o f the consequences o f voting behaviour.
What this simplified analysis shows is that it is theoretically possible that 
politicians will look not just to the immediate consequences o f their voting 
behaviour but to the long term consequences and will as a result forego short 
term benefit for long term ones. However the problem, as with all rational 
choice models o f decision making, o f collective action emerges. At some 
stage a member o f parliament will vote against the party because he knows 
that just because he did it and got away with it not everyone else who wishes 
to do it will actually do so when it comes to them vote against the party. Thus 
politicians will frequently choose to ‘free-ride’ when deciding how to vote - 
they will vote against a particular issue when they are opposed to it but expect 
everyone to vote with the party on issues with which they agree.
Recognising that people will choose to free-ride the central party may choose 
to introduce compliance mechanisms to encourage or force individual MPs to 
vote with their party. Mitchell (1995, p. 14) notes that ‘leaders (at least of 
European political parties) have immense resources with which to seduce, 
cajole or discipline recalcitrant militants’. Crowe (1986) claims that in a 
W estminster type system party leaders commonly have four mechanisms of 
compliance with which either to encourage or threaten MPs who may be
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undecided about supporting their party. These can be classified as either 
rewards for loyalty or punishment for disloyalty.
Following this therefore it is necessary to examine the costs and benefits 
associated with an act o f disloyalty to the party in the parliamentary arena. 
This allows for an accurate depiction o f utility for our models. If  the costs are 
greater than the benefits, ceteris paribus, our model predicts that deputies will 
remain loyal however bizarre it may seem. Consequently the nub o f our 
model rests on how the parties and wider political environment react to 
indiscipline. As noted in chapter two the immediate penalty is the loss o f the 
party whip. Consequently we begin by exploring the likely effect o f this on a 
politician.
5.6 L O S IN G  T H E  P A R T Y  W H IP : W H A T  IT  M E A N S
L oss o f  p a r tic ip a to ry  rights
A TD expelled from the parliamentary party loses the right to attend the 
weekly meeting o f the parliamentary party. As such meetings are held behind 
closed doors we can only hazard a guess as to what typically occurs and 
consequently how important they are. Usually where the party is in 
government, ministers will use the opportunity to brief their colleagues on the 
backbenches on what is happening. If required, the opinions o f the party is 
often obtained from the participation and comments o f members at the
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meeting and sometimes the party leadership may be warned o f the possible 
discomfort a particular policy would bring to the members in their own 
constituencies. However, by and large, government ministers and party 
leaders tend to keep their backbenchers in the dark regarding policy.
Another possible benefit could be the removal o f access to a government 
minister or department. As Gallagher and Komito (1996, p. 165) note TD ’s 
‘constituents expect them to be active constituency representatives, taking up 
their personal or communal problems or grievances with the relevant 
government department.’ The point is that it is likely to be much easier to 
gain access to a minister or front bench spokesperson to ‘lobby’ on behalf of 
your constituents’ if  you are a member o f the party. The ultimate cost of 
having no success in representing your constituents interests could entail 
failure to get re-elected at the next election.
One o f the major sources o f power for the parliamentary party concerns the 
selection or deselection of the party leader. This is usually seen as the most 
important role o f a parliamentary party because as Marsh (1993a, p. 229) 
notes
parliamentary elections are commonly “presidential” in 
character, with each party’s leader playing a very prominent 
role in the campaign. In government too party leaders play a
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decisive role in policy formulation and selection in both 
single party and coalition governments.
Given the importance for re-election and promotional prospects being 
outside the circle o f activity may be a disadvantage. This is especially so in 
Ireland where incumbent leaders are challenged relatively frequently (Marsh, 
1993b, p. 295).
L oss o fp ro m o tio n a l p ro sp ec ts
In the Irish case promotion takes two forms. Firstly at a minor level it may 
relate to sitting on Oireachtas (joint or single) committees and being 
appointed a committee chair or even taking the chair o f the house (Ceann 
Comhairle for the Dail). More important for many is the hope o f appointment 
by the party leader to the party frontbench and if in government to a 
ministerial rank. Indeed this is one o f the few ‘carrots’ which party leaders 
seem to have at their absolute discretion. However the small number o f 
parliamentarians means that as far as committee membership is concerned the 
problem is usually with obtaining enough members to form a committee.
One former committee chair between 1987 and 1989 has commented on her 
difficulty in getting enough members to be present to form a quorum (Hussey, 
1993, P. 70). With regard to the office o f Ceann Comhairle the norm seems to 
be to appoint members with a ‘long record of service’. Moreover the
1 20
numerical strength o f the government parties may mean that a member from 
outside the governing parliamentary parties will be selected to hold the office 
(this occurred on many occasions, most recently with the appointment o f a 
Labour Party deputy to the post with the support o f the Fianna Fail / 
Progressive Democrat minority government..
L oss o f  trave l p r iv ileg es
One o f the few perks which a TD could cite is the possibility o f doing service 
to Ireland by travelling abroad on a ‘fact finding mission.’ Usually this 
involves an all expenses paid trip, staying at the best hotels and being ‘wmed 
and dined’ by foreign governments or private interests. In some cases the 
mission will require the attendance o f the deputies’ spouses. W hile trips to 
India (1997 All-party delegation headed by the Ceann Comhairle to 
investigate the Indian parliamentary system) are arduous and burdensome 
tasks o f state one will normally find members queuing up to do their duty! 
And it is the party whips who decide who goes where if anywhere at all.
Loss o f  fa c ilitie s
Compared to their counterparts in other legislatures Irish parliamentarians are 
poorly resourced in terms of services and facilities available to them. A 
backbench TD can expect to have only one funded secretary and a small
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administrative budget for the running of the constituency and/or Leinster 
House office.
The facilities available are governed by the Committee on Procedure and 
Privileges6. The committee is one o f the most important in the Oireachtas and 
is composed o f 17 TDs including the party whips, and is chaired by the Ceann 
Comhairle. The fact that an all party committee with a chairperson above 
party politics has the ability to disperse this gain ensures that formally at least 
it is not available for abuse by party mandarins. That o f course is not to say 
that they would not try.
The former Fianna Fail Minister for Justice Maire Geoghan Quinn recalled 
the treatment she and four other TDs received after they participated in a 
failed attempt to remove the then Taoiseach, Charles J Haughey, from 
leadership o f the party in November 1991. Following their return to the 
backbenches (from the cabinet or junior government posts) they were placed 
in Tasmania Avenue. The name apparently derived from the nature o f the 
offices, far from the centre o f gravity in Leinster House and very poorly 
serviced ‘without phones or filing cabinets and with hardly a chair or table 
between them ’ (The Irish Times, 12 April 1997). The troubles experienced by 
her and her colleagues when they fell out o f favour with the party leadership
6 Committee on Procedures and Privileges may be required to right a wrong against an 
individual member of either house. In M arch 1990 an independent Senator sought a judicial 
review when the Cathaoirleach of the Seanad (Sean Doherty) suspended the member and 
declined to remove himself from the committee during the hearing of the appeal by the 
Senator. The issue was resolved when the Seanad withdrew the suspension of senator Norris
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highlight the minor things at the disposal o f parties to warn their members. 
More importantly however it illustrates that entitlements to basic facilities are 
a right o f members and consequently the supply o f which is independent of 
the wishes or desires o f ones party.
Following the change in government in 1994 which was the first mid-term 
change ever experienced the government was left in a dangerous position in 
the Seanad - as the previous Taoiseach had appointed 11 members rather than 
the new Taoiseach. The facilities for the six University Senators were, 
apparently, dramatically improved so as to aid them in deciding whether or
* • 7not to support the government on issues coming before the Seanad.
A further facility out o f bounds for disobedient members are the party rooms 
and access to party based facilities. Party rooms are located in Leinster House 
and along with the members’ bar, restaurant and corridors provide an 
opportunity for casual political activity. But the fact that an option exists in 
the bar and restaurant and that these are independent o f party j^ven- 
independent members o f parliamem^bave access) indicates that the barring of 
someone would not be too traumatic for the person concerned.
O f greater possible concern to a potential rebel must be the removal of 
facilities that are provided by the party. W hile these obviously vary among 
parties depending on their financial resources most maintain some facilities
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that a TD will find useful. Take for example the party press office (or in 
smaller parties the press officer). This resource is available not just to 
frontbench spokespersons (government ministers have a department press 
office at their disposal) but all o f the members o f the parliamentary party and 
is invaluable in assisting TD to get press coverage, either at a local or national 
level for issues they want to promote. In a similar way parties have been 
known to provide tutoring for incumbents to improve their campaigning 
skills.
Yet another potentially valuable service is the party research service. Each 
party receives a substantial subvention from the state to assist in undertaking 
research. W hile we might expect that the bulk o f this goes towards assisting 
party spokespersons, all members are entitled to avail o f the service.
5.7 R E F L E C T IO N  O N  T H E  W H IP  S Y S T E M
As we have seen, the whip system in the Dail is very tightly controlled. Not 
unexpectedly this not to the liking o f everyone. Speaking in 1996 during a 
debate on the reform o f the Oireachtas Jim Mitchell, TD, a prominent Fine 
Gael backbencher, has some stark words to say about the operation o f the 
whip system:
7 Confidential observations of one former University Senator made to Eunan O ’Halpin.
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The worst feature o f the Dail today is the excessively tight 
whipping system through which all different or new ideas are 
siphoned. This creates an atmosphere in which deputies are 
discouraged from researching and expressing their own ideas.
The irony is that all attempts o f Dail reform has been instigated 
by the Government Chief Whip whose overriding concern is to 
protect the Government. It is not surprising therefore that the 
sum total o f Dail reform has had a comatose effect on the Dail.
  If  the Dail is so tightly controlled under the whipping
system by the Government which is supposed to be answerable 
to it, it is easy to understand why dullness and mediocrity is the 
order o f the day.
( Dail debates Vol. 469 No 6 , W ednesday 9 October, col. 1896- 
1897)
The operation o f the whip system also angers interest groups and those 
wishing to change public policy because it is almost always impossible to get 
any legislation through the Dail and Seanad without the support o f the 
Government. During 1993 the independent TD Tony Gregory introduced a 
bill to outlaw and prohibit hare coursing, something which while it caused 
polarisation among supporters and objectors seemed to be desired by the vast 
majority o f people outside the Dail. However when it came to a vote on the 
bill the whip was imposed and only 16 TD voted for with 104 voting against. 
In a letter to The Sunday Tribune one angry citizen wrote:
In its present form, the whip system is clearly undemocratic 
and amounts to little more than a thinly disguised form of
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intimidation. The Dail debate on hare coursing underlined 
just how ruthless and draconian is the function o f the whip 
in Irish politics. The whip system shouldn’t just be reformed, 
it should be scrapped. It’s about time we dispensed with this 
politically cobwebbed relic of the nineteenth century.
O f course the whips and party leaders would hold a different view (at least 
while in office!). In an article the then Government Chief Whip, Noel 
Dempsey defended the tight Fianna Fail whip with two arguments (The 
Sunday Tribune, 1 August 1993). Firstly he claimed it was necessary for the 
conduct o f party government:
The whip system gives coherence and cohesion to political 
parties and, through them, to the nation’s business in 
parliament. It allows the whips representing each party to 
plan better the processing o f Dail or Seanad business, 
especially legislation. The whip system leads to greater 
certainty in the business o f parliament, especially when there 
is a minority government or a government with a slim 
majority.
But in his attempt to de-demonise the approach Dempsey goes further, 
claiming that
properly understood, the whip system is a cornerstone o f our 
system o f representative parliamentary democracy ... our 
parliamentary system is based on the democratic election of,
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in the main, members o f a number o f political parties. Put at 
its simplest, policies which they have put before the people 
at election time. In that way people know what they are 
voting for and may decide accordingly.
In the same article Dempsey defends the highly controversial issue o f party 
whipping on issues involving moral dilemmas or conscientious objections 
for deputies:
if we allow the concept, the real question becomes: where 
do we draw the line? One person’s issue o f conscience may 
be an everyday reality for someone else. So w e end up back 
at square one, with everyone taking an individual line, the 
whip gone and representative parliamentary democracy 
whittled away. W eighted in the balance against that 
outcome, I think the clear verdict must be against allowing 
exceptions for so-called issues o f conscience
O f course it is not just the party that influences the decisions o f deputies. 
They must also appeal to the broader political landscape. Most notable is the 
need to satisfy the needs o f their constituents in order to gain re-election. We 
now turn to these other influences which we have titled environmental
1 2 7
5.8 T H E  P O L IT IC A L  E N V IR O N M E N T
Bunreacht N a hEireann provides that the electoral system for Dail elections 
be proportional representation by means o f single transferable vote (PR STV) 
with a district magnitude of no less than three seats and no more than five 
Thus we are marked out from other countries who rely either on a plurality 
(first past the post) or a list system.
My argument is very simple; compared with other electoral systems PR STV 
as it operates in Ireland reduces the role and usefulness o f political parties for 
candidates. I f  I can show that this is indeed so then yet another tool at the
disposal o f European political parties to discipline their members is absent in 
Ireland.
Let us first o f all compare the obvious case o f an electoral system where party 
is paramount. The party list system (as used in the Netherlands) gives the 
central party the most control over its parliamentarians. Under this system the 
party draws up a list o f politicians it would like to see in parliament. Usually 
the party leader will head the list. The electoral system treats the whole 
country as a single constituency and voters vote for a party. The number of 
seats each party obtains is based on its share o f the vote. The higher up the list 
the more chance o f getting into the new parliament one has. Thus this system 
represents the most dramatic form o f centre party control - if  you are not
The electoral system
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performing as required by the party you will possibly fail to be put on the list 
or be put on towards the bottom. Failure to get on the party list will ensure 
that you will not be returned to the next parliament as the only other plausible 
option - to form a new political party - is not very viable under such a system.
The plurality or first past the post system also benefits the central party. The 
key feature o f  this electoral system is that each constituency only returns a 
single representative. Consequently each party will have only one candidate 
and if you are not a party candidate your chances o f obtaining a plurality o f 
the vote are very slim. Thus in the United Kingdom it is extremely rare for an 
independent candidate to secure election.
C an didate  se lec tion  a n d  re-selection
Mayhew (1974, p. 13) argues that the main ambition o f an incumbent US 
congressman is to gain re-election. And normally the first hurdle facing an 
incumbent politician is to gain support for re-selection as the party candidate. 
In Irish political parties re-selection for sitting TDs is not automatic - instead 
they must present themselves in front o f a selection convention. Indeed it has 
been known on occasions for sitting TDs to fail to gain the support o f the 
convention.
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For us the key question revolves around who in the party selects the 
candidates. Is it the party elite who could threaten to de-select or is it the local 
party organisation who would not necessarily be as concerned with a deputy’s 
record o f support for his or her party? In Ireland the answer lies somewhere in 
between
An important point to note is that despite its centrality to the political system 
and our notions o f representation and democracy the candidate selection 
procedure is not placed on a statutory footing, unlike for example in Norway, 
and consequently parties are free to make their own rules and follow their 
own procedures.
Despite this, the procedure follows the same principles in each party although 
exact mechanisms differ. It is the local party organised at constituency level 
that selects the candidates. The convention usually takes place in anticipation 
of an election and is attended by delegates representing the grass roots level 
of the party. Incumbents usually have to go through the same process as 
others seeking a candidacy although in Fianna Fail the practice is normally to 
commence the meeting with a motion to select the incumbents by 
acclamation. The only role o f the centre party would seem to be the 
appointment o f a convention chairman to oversee the proper conduct o f the 
meeting. The chair is normally a senior party politician from outside the 
constituency.
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This view underestimates the power o f the central party in the candidate 
selection mechanism in three ways. Usually the party will indicate to the 
convention the number o f candidates to be selected which could have the 
effect o f making the re-election prospects o f certain candidates more difficult. 
This is therefore one reason to be loyal to the party leadership.
Second, nearly all parties reserve the right to impose candidates on the 
convention, either before or after the actual decision o f the delegates. An 
imposed candidate usually takes two distinguishable forms: an incumbent or 
party favourite who has been excluded by the convention, when this exclusion 
is deemed not to be in the interest o f  the party. Secondly, and more 
controversially as we have seen in recent European Parliament elections, the 
central party may ‘parachute’ a non-party figure who enjoys high popular 
appeal based on their other work (Marsh, 1995, p. 210).
The other power o f the centre derives from its right to refuse to sanction the 
selection o f candidates if it so wishes. W hen candidates are selected their 
names are forwarded by the convention chairman to the party National 
Executive in Dublin who can then either accept the decision o f the 
convention delegates or strike the name of any person off the list o f party 
candidates. However as Gallagher (1988) notes, this power has only
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infrequently been used as it would cause a possible rebellion among members 
o f the local party organisation.
While the role o f the centre is thus important and growing, what conclusions 
can be drawn? The fact that the local party jealously guards its right to select 
its own candidates ensures that, by and large, TDs are not dependent on the 
backing o f the party leadership and can act without the fear o f  being de­
selected. However two caveats apply. Firstly the centre still plays a role in the 
process that could affect TDs. M oreover a TD continuously out o f favour 
with his masters in Dublin ought to be wary o f the grassroots who often 
remain loyal to the party leadership, and o f their possible contempt for 
dissidents.
C am paign  su p p o rt a n d  fin an ce
Irish political parties are notoriously underfunded. W hile party leaders receive 
money from the state to assist with running head office and frontbench much 
o f the finance seems to come from donations from individuals and business 
(c.f. Farrell, 1993, p. 32-34). Consequently parties do not have extensive 
funds to share with candidates at election time. What money they have is, by 
and large, spent by the national party. The only assistance given by the head 
office is with printing o f manifestos for the candidates and the provision of
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policy briefs. Essentially however individual candidates receive little financial 
support.
Interestingly, the Electoral Bill published in 1994 and amended in light o f the 
M cKenna judgem ent in the Supreme Court, provides for the financing of 
individual candidates who are not affiliated to any party at a rate higher than 
that given to a party for each o f their candidates. Likewise in setting limits on 
campaign expenditure by individual candidates the Bill allowed for non-party 
candidates to spend 150 per cent o f the amount allowable for party 
candidates. Consequently if  the bill were enacted a monetary advantage 
would exist for an incumbent to leave his or her party so as to obtain the 
financial support o f the state.
L oss o f  lo ca l p a r ty  m achine
The party machine is part o f  the less formal architecture o f Irish political 
parties. It varies in its existence and intensity from constituency to 
constituency and party to party. Machine politics in Ireland is closely 
associated with the former TD Neil Blaney and his supporters in his North 
Donegal Constituency. A machine is an organisation o f people led by a leader 
with the sole objective o f securing success for that person at election time (for 
interesting and detailed accounts o f the operation o f machines in Cork and 
Donegal c.f. respectively Bax, 1979; Sacks, 1979).
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Irish constituencies are relatively large (in terms of geographical spread)
A
given the district magnitude and size o f the electorate stipulated in the 
constitution. Allied to the localism inherent in Irish political culture, it ensures 
that a candidate needs a well oiled organisation if he or she is to stand any 
success in an election. W hile campaigning has become more presidential in 
nature the local element is still a key determinant o f success or failure. Thus 
having people to canvas from door to door is an absolute necessity to success 
in any general election in Ireland. Candidates rely on party activists to 
perform this task and not having the support o f the party would make life 
much more difficult for candidates.
P olitica l culture a n d  expectations
Politicians elected to the Dail are elected as representatives o f their 
constituents. Thus the views o f those people regarding discipline are critical 
to a deputy’s behaviour presuming that he or she wishes to attend to the 
wishes o f the electorate if only in the hope o f gaining re-election. Chubb 
(1978, p. 10-11) draws attention to the localism inherent in Irish politics:
These locally based representatives are expected by their 
constituents to attend to their needs for those services that are to 
be obtained from public authorities such as housing, land 
redistribution, social security and health services, grants for this
I
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and that, and occasionally jobs. They must also work 
continuously for facilities for their own area. In return, they will 
hope to be rewarded with their constituents votes.
In a study comparing the work of Irish and British parliamentarians Wood 
and Young (1997, p. 226) support the view that TDs are obliged to do work 
for their constituents:
Our findings, based on data generated through parallel 
interviews with junior legislators in both countries, support 
the dominant view found in the literature. TDs do perform 
more constituency services than do MPs, and TDs are more 
strongly activated by reelection motivation. The relationship 
between reelection motivation and constituency activity by 
TDs is statistically significant.
National politics only matters when it is an aid to the local deputy in directly 
assisting his constituents. Thus being allied to a party is advantageous to build 
contacts with government departments and for the most successful as a means 
o f obtaining a cabinet portfolio. A cabinet portfolio is seen by constituents as 
a means to an end - namely more investment in the constituency. While no 
study has conclusively posited a benefit from a constituency being served by a 
minister, perception and casual observation suggest that a minister can 
strengthen his electoral appeal by using his office to assist the constituency. 
High spending government departments such as the Department o f the 
Environment, in charge o f the national road infrastructure and financing local
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authority road improvements, could make a deputy a victor in his or her 
constituency
The point is that ordinary voters seem to care little what their deputies do in 
the Dail, whether the vote with or against their party, whether the cause a 
national scandal or not, so long as the deputy is servicing the needs o f his or 
her constituents.
5.9 R E A S S E S S IN G  T H E  M O D E L
The evidence of the costs and benefits o f disobeying the party whip goes 
some way towards providing an explanation o f voting behaviour. However an 
alternative explanation which remains credible is that deputies unquestionably 
accept the whip because their peers and predecessors have done likewise. 
This explanation has its basis in neo-institutional theories o f political 
behaviour. Institutional theorists argue that the way to under stand behaviour 
is by looking at the rules and regulations that shape that behaviour. 
Institutionalism was the dominant approach in political science for many 
years. This is due in no small part to the belief that as Rhodes (1995, p. 42) 
reports, ‘the focus on institutions was a matter o f common sense.’ Thus to 
understand the political system all that was needed was a list o f the rules, 
regulations and to a certain degree the norms of the system.
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A country would be primarily be explained in terms o f its constitutional and 
legal structure. But institutional theory is more than just a description o f the 
political institutions it surveys. The theory goes further by attempting to 
explain what happens in a political system by drawing a causal link between 
the institutions and behaviour - in other words institutions prescribe 
behaviour rather than behaviour prescribing institutions.
W hile the rational choice approach seems very profitable in the case of 
explaining disciplined behaviour one would be very foolish to completely 
ignore the important role o f tradition and socialisation which would be 
engendered into deputies as we have seen from previous chapters. As Booth 
et. al. (1993,2) has pointed out,
the interest in individualism is methodological: rational 
choice theorists do not conceive of persons as atomized, 
self-sufficient monads. Rather, persons are thought o f as 
embedded in networks, contexts and institutions, and choice 
is considered to take place within constraints ... Theories o f 
rational choice could not get off the ground if their subject 
matter was a decontextualised actor.
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This chapter has shown that a combination o f rational choice and structural- 
institutional approaches to understanding behaviour provide a powerful 
insight into the nature o f discipline in parliamentary parties. The model 
developed on the basis o f decision theory and game theory draws tentative 
conclusions about the basic motivation of politicians in deciding how to vote 
in the legislative arena.
Applying the model to Irish parliamentary parties showed the power that 
parties have over deputies. However our analysis also highlighted the 
shortcomings o f the whip system and the need of the party leadership to 
remain sensitive to the wishes o f the majority o f the parliamentary party.
A further argument espoused was that the political environment has an 
important part to play in shaping the behaviour o f deputies. While some 
variables, such as the candidate selection process with the vetoing power of 
the national organisation, w ork to increase the dependence on the party other 
variables work to increase the independent abilities o f deputies. Most notably 
the political culture works to ensure deputies must remain sensitive to the 
needs o f his or her own constituents even where these interests clash with 
official party policy.
5.9 SUM M ARY
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C O N C L U S I O N I
In systems of parliamentary government, where the executive is formed from and is 
responsible to the parliament, political parties are pivotal players. Parliament is 
composed of sovereign individual parliamentarians but in reality we have seen that 
it is also tyrannised by political parties.
Irish parliamentarians are not alone in being agents o f  their party. In most 
parliamentary democracies the role and influence o f the individual representative is 
greatly diminished by the party organisation. This coercion is frequently legitimised 
on account o f the need for strong party government. The argument postulated is 
that if parliamentary party members were free to support or reject the policy o f the 
cabinet, the system o f government decision making would break down due to 
uncertainty
Methodological complications abound when we attempt to define exactly what we 
mean by discipline. The predominant mechanism through which discipline is 
measured remains the roll-call analysis o f voting in national parliaments. The level 
of cohesive voting within parties is used as guage o f the level o f  discipline. Many 
have neglected to consider that cohesive voting may not be caused by the 
enforcement o f discipline but may occur naturally - as we could expect that 
members o f the same party are inclined to vote in a like manner regardless o f any
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direction from the party leadership. Thus when we consider discipline we must 
remain vigilant to the possibility that what we term discipline has nothing to do 
with discipline.
In our study o f the Irish party system we were able to discount the existence o f 
natural cohesion. An analysis of the mean number o f parties, which indicated 
relatively fewer parties in our system, and the origin o f  the modern party system, 
which is based on civil- war rather than contemporary policy concerns, suggested 
that Irish parties may be actually less ideologically cohesive than parties in other 
countries.
A roll-call analysis o f  Dai 1 divisions during 1996 showed that in terms o f voting 
behaviour Irish parliamentarians are highly disciplined with the roll-call reporting 
100 per cent cohesion. The limited study confirmed the conventional wisdom that 
deputies act as agents o f their respective parties in the legislative arena.
It is also clear that party organisations place great emphasis on discipline and 
respect for the decisions o f the party leadership and parliamentary party. Candidates 
are required to sign an oath o f  allegiance to the party before being able to attempt 
to obtain an official nomination. If successful members are immediately introduced 
to the formal structures o f the parliamentary party. Each of the parties in Ireland 
have a party whip whose main responsibility is to ensure that members are told 
what do to do, ensure that they do as requested and in the event o f them not
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following the instructions ensure that they are appropriately disciplined. 
Consequently TD are advised how or if they should vote by the party or 
government whip. Failure to support one’s party in a vote in the Dail or Seanad 
almost inevitably results in expulsion from the parliamentary party for a period 
usually not less than three months and not more than a year.
Over the years there have been a small number o f cases o f deputies and Senators 
breaking the party whip. On average this occurs only once or twice a year. The 
issues which give rise to rebellions vary from local constituency matters, where a 
TD feels obliged to make a stance if only for the benefit o f his own local support, 
to issues o f national policy that are important to some individuals.
Rational choice approaches to understanding human behaviour provide an 
excellent starting point when attempting to model the behaviour o f TD in the 
legislative arena. Based on decision theory a formal model was constructed to 
explain the high levels o f voting discipline. An elementary game theoretic model 
added to our understanding o f the inter dependent nature o f the process and the 
possibility o f free riding by individual politicians. Essentially we found that it is 
rational for deputies to accept the decision o f their parties even when they 
themselves do not agree with the decision because o f the need to develop stable 
party policies and allowing those policies the greatest possible chance of 
implementation by having all party members vote for them.
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Even if a deputy is motivated by something other than policy implementation an 
examination o f the costs and benefits o f breaking the party whip indicates that it is 
again rational for deputies nearly always to follow the whip and refrain from 
breaking it. The latter comes about because o f the central role played by parties in 
the political system and the dependence that individual deputies have on the party.
However although some degree o f independence does exist the party leadership 
must take care not to offend members as individual deputies may be faced with 
having to be seen to support their own constituency interests in the face o f 
unpopular party policy. Indeed where a deputy does not break ranks with his party 
and the issue is important to his constituents not doing so may cost the incumbent, 
and his or her party a seat at the next general election.
The study has therefore gone some way towards documenting, describing and 
explaining the fascinating phenomenon that is party control over individual 
deputies in Irish parliamentary parties.
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A P P E N D I X  O N E 1
G O V E R N M E N T  C H I E F  W H I P S 2
Daniel McCarthy 1922 - 24
Seamus O ’Dolan 192 4 -2 7
Eamon O ’Duggain 1927 - 32
Gerald Boland 1932- 33
Patrick J Little 1933 - 39
Patrick Smyth 1939-43
Eamonn Kissane 1943 -4 8
Liam Cosgrave 1948 - 51
Donnchadh O ’Brian 1951 - 54
Denis O ’Sullivan 1954- 57
Donnchadh O ’Brian 1957 - 61
Joseph Brennan 1961 -6 5
Michael Carty 1965 - 70
Desmond O ’Malley 1969- 70
David Andrews 1970-73
John Kelly 1973 - 77
1 Source: Bracken (1995), various D ail D ebates.
2 Since the foundation of the State the official title of the chief whip has changed twice; 
originally Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Executive Council, after 1937 
amended to Parliamentary Secretaiy to the Taoiseach and since 1978 the Chief Whip has been a 
M inister for State at the Department of the Taoiseach. So for example, the current chief whip, 
Seamus Brennan is M inister of State a t the Departments of the Taoiseach and Defence and 
Government Chief Whip.
1 43
Patrick Lalor 1977 - 79
Michael W oods 1979- 80
Sean Moore 1980- 81
Gerry L ’ Estrange 1981
Fergus O ’Brien 1981 - 82
Bertie Ahem 1982
Sean Barrett 198 2 -8 6
Fergus O ’Brien 1986-87
Vincent Brady 1987 - 92
Noel Dempsey 1 9 9 2 -9 4
Sean Barrett 1994-95
Jim Higgins 1995 -9 7
Seamus Brennan 1997 -
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A P P E N D I X  T WO
THE P A R L I A M E N T A R Y  G A M E
I hear, and I forget;
I see, and I remember, 
I do, and I understand.
This chapter attempts to examine the disciplined behaviour o f politicians in the 
legislative arena by developing a simulation. As we will see below simulations 
(or games as they are frequently referred to) provide a way of observing, 
understanding and learning about various political phenomena. The chapter 
continues by outlining how a simulation to examine the nature o f party 
discipline can be constructed. The remainder o f the chapter details the 
development o f the specific simulation, how it is played and what 
happens/should happen when it is played. We conclude with a critique of the 
simulation method and our own specific game.
S IM U L A T IO N S  IN  P O L IT IC A L  S C IE N C E
Unlike other research methodologies, such as surveys, interviews, field 
observations and content-analysis, laboratory experiments are infrequently
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used in the social sciences. Essentially the methodology is based on the belief 
that any real-world event can be simulated in a simulation.
Stein Greenbalt (1988, p. 14) defines a simulation as ‘an operating model of 
central features or elements o f a real or proposed system, process, or 
environment.’ Put very simply a simulation is a model o f some element or 
potential element o f real life. W hat makes simulations different from other 
forms o f models in the social sciences, such as a mathematical model, is that it 
is dynamic as opposed to static. Like other types o f models it does not attempt 
to capture every aspect o f the real-life situation it is attempting to examine - 
rather it only includes specific elements which are considered important to the 
overall picture.
Confusion often arises when the terms ‘gam e’ and ‘simulation’ are used 
interchangeably. There are however important differences between the two. A 
simulation is, as we said, simply a model. Like a simulation, a game involves 
parameters (rules), participants (players) and choices (with related outcomes). 
But the essence o f a game is that it involves players developing strategies 
based on interdependent decision making. Thus many simulations are games 
(a simulation o f wage bargaining) and many games are simulations (the 
marriage game) but not all simulations are games (a simulation o f an 
emergency plan) and not all games are simulations (poker). The most 
interesting simulations for political scientists are usually games, as they give a
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feel for the interaction between different players with their respective 
incentives to compete or cooperate.
W e will return to the advantages and disadvantages o f our methodology at the 
end o f the chapter but before moving on to developing the simulation it is 
worth quoting from one o f the earliest users o f this method. W riting in the late 
1970s Fiorini and Plott (1978, p567) asked:
W hat makes us believe, for example, that we can use 
college students to simulate the behaviour o f Congress 
members? Nothing. Our beliefs are much more modest.
W e intend to use the laboratory as a screen for basic 
ideas: if  a model does not predict well relative to others 
under a specific set o f conditions in the controlled 
world o f the laboratory, why should it receive 
preferential treatment as an explanation o f non­
laboratory behaviour occurring under similar 
conditions?
B U IL D IN G  T H E  S IM U L A T IO N
One of the leading game designers, Stein Greenblat (1988), identified five 
distinct stages in the development o f a simulation. Those were as follows:
♦ setting objectives and parameters
♦ model development
♦ decisions about representation
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♦ construction and modification
♦ preparation for use by others
In this section we take the reader through each step, explaining what was 
required to be done and the issues and dilemmas we encountered at each stage 
in trying to make the model as realistic as possible, useful for testing our 
claims but still operationalisable. Much o f the preparation for the simulation 
must draw on the decisions taken in building the theoretical model in the 
previous chapter.
a. Setting  ob jec tives a n d  p a ra m eters
The object o f the experiment is to test the model developed in the previous 
chapter regarding the behaviour o f members o f a parliament. Specifically 
therefore we are seeking to observe, understand and explain behaviour o f 
individual players when they are required to interact in a party and vote on 
motions and legislation in a parliament. Our dependent variable will therefore 
be the level o f cohesion observed and our independent variables will reflect 
the various rules and norms associated with a typical legislative arena.
b. D ecisions a b ou t represen ta tion
A form of iconic representation o f the subject matter was necessary as it would 
be unrealistic to find 166 subjects. Indeed the number o f participants for the 
test run was set at 2 0 , based on the number o f students available for the 
experiment. The students came from the authors class on Game Theory at the
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Irish Centre for Talented Youth, Dublin City University. One potential worry 
arose because the students would learn how to act rationally in any strategic 
interaction during the course. Consequently the experiments were undertaken 
during the first few days o f the course in late July. Further information on how 
the game was actually played is detailed in the report later.
c. M o d e l developm en t
The experiment was constructed in a number o f steps and we will now 
summarise each step and the key decisions taken at each point.
W e are attempting to construct a game about the behaviour o f politicians in a 
parliament with decision making powers and existing political parties.
The first task therefore is to assign players to parties. W hile this could be done 
randomly an alternative is to gauge the beliefs and opinions o f participants. To 
do this prior to actually playing the game participants are asked to give replies 
to some questions on topical issues. An alternative way is to assign players 
randomly.
The next step was to form political parties. It was decided that for the first play 
there would only be two parties. At the start o f the game each member was 
placed in the team. The first job o f each team was to select a party leader. In 
order to induce candidates the people selected as leader and chief whip would
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receive a  salary o f  £5 and £3 respectively. The electoral system is PR STV. If 
no candidate emerged one would be selected at random.
The rules o f the game were then introduced to all players. Essentially each 
team leader was told to maximise the cohesion of his or her party in the voting 
that would take place. The team leader would be rewarded based on a sliding 
scale related to the actual level o f cohesion. Each team member was told that 
they were a member o f a political party to which they had pledged loyalty. 
Each was required to sign such a pledge.
Thereafter each were told that they could maximise their welfare in two 
possible ways:
1 . by voting with the party and ensuring party solidarity would win money for 
their party a share o f which they would be entitled to.
2 . by attempting to enter into deals with the other party they could negotiate for 
extra money either from their own party or from the other party leader.
Every time a party voted with absolute cohesion they were awarded a certain 
number o f points - in reality based on a sum of money. For each round, 
represented by each voting decision, a two minute period was allowed for 
inter-party bargaining where everyone could be cajoled by each other. Voting 
was secret as none of the participants are meant to know how anyone else 
voted until after the count. Points were allocated to each player and team by 
the game director during the subsequent decision making round.
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Members were required to vote within a one minute period on pre distributed 
forms.
ROUNDS
Players were told that there would be an indefinite number o f rounds. 
Consequently nobody knew when the game would terminate and could not 
forecast their best moves for each round with perfect information.
PLAYING THE GAME
As is essential in any major simulation some materials were required for the 
game. At the basic level each player was required to wear a team badge so as 
to be easily identifiable as a member o f the team to the leader, whip and other 
players. Each player was also given voting cards. On each card they were 
required to vote yes or no to the particular motion. The voting card was then 
placed in a unmarked envelope and given to the game director.
THE ESSENCE OF THE GAME
The essence o f the game is to see how individuals would behave when faced 
with a choice o f whether to vote with party colleagues or to vote with the other 
party. Essentially, would they vote as directed by the party leader and party 
whip or would they vote according to their own preferences where this was 
different? To win a player had to weigh up the short, medium and long term
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costs and benefits o f following the guidance o f the collective party as opposed 
to bargaining with the opposition.
The game should also provide insights into the ‘non-rationaF aspects of 
decision making such as moral consciousness o f agreeing to abide but then not 
doing so. Indeed seeing how peers can inflict pressure on fellow politicians to 
act in a certain way must be seen as one o f the insights provided by playing the 
simulation.
d. P repara tion  f o r  use by  others
In preparing the simulation for use it is important to ensure that the 
information provided is neither too complex or too simple. W e have followed 
the format established by Michael Laver (1997b, 1979) and Bergstrom and 
Miller (1997). Thus we provide in some two pages an introduction, a note on 
equipment, the basic rules of the game and a list o f variations with which the 
game can be played. A short analysis o f  the game for when the game has been 
played must also be included. This is reproduced at the end o f this appendix.
R E S U LT S  O F P L A Y IN G  T H E  S IM U L A T IO N
3 ™The Parliamentary game was first played by a group o f 19 participants . The 
results o f each round o f voting is reproduced in table 6 . 1 .
3 The class was comprised of students from a number of different nationalities aged between 12 
and 16. To gain entrance to the three week programme participants were required to sit the
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Table 6.1: Results o f The Parliam entaiy Game
round number no of defectors in party 
1
no o f defectors in party 
2
1 1 2
2 1 3
3 1 5
4 3 4
5 5 6
The winner o f  the game was the member o f party one who constantly defected 
in each round. As we expected pressure played a major factor for wavering 
members o f the two parliamentary parties. W hat we also see is that, as the 
game progressed and the defectors continued to receive increasing amounts o f 
money, players who initially always remained loyal began to rebel.
A  C R IT IQ U E  O F T H E  S IM U L A T IO N  A P P R O A C H
The use o f simulations as a legitimate research tool in the social sciences has 
not gone without much debate, criticism and counter-criticism. It is only 
proper that this information be shared with readers. W here it is possible the 
arguments made by methodologists will be examined in light of our own 
experience in using the laboratory experimentation approach. O f course when
Standard Aptitude Tests, examinations usually required for 17-18 year old students to gain 
entrance into US Universities. Furthermore participants were required to be placed in the top 2 
per cent for their age group. The majority normally are within the top 1 percent in terms of 
academic ability for their age cohort. This of course begs the question as to whether they are 
very different from whom they are representing given their high level of academic ability.
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methodologists criticise and compliment the lab approach they are comparing 
it to the dominant alternative approach to social science research.
The primary argument could be that the best way to understand something is to 
view it and this can only be done in the natural environment and not in an 
artificially created one. Thus to study politicians w e must observe politicians. 
While this is completely justified the problem is that we cannot equate 
observation and causal explanation. In our case we observed TDs voting 
behaviour but were unable to formulate any scientifically valid explanations o f 
their behaviour because o f the multitude o f possible independent variables. 
Even the most hardened political scientist could not suggest changing the 
‘rules of the gam e’ as played by real-life politicians so as to obtain a cause-and 
effect explanation. Consequently the field experiment is just not an option for 
a study o f this nature.
A related criticism o f the simulation technique wherever it is used is that one 
cannot simulate a complex real-life situation in an experiment with a few 
subjects. Thus for example in our model the participants have not been 
socialised by 2 0  or more years o f membership of and loyalty to a party. 
Likewise other parameters must be artificially induced. Again monetary 
rewards act as the motivational variable where in real life the motivational 
variable would be career enhancement.
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A problem faced in many research techniques is the problem o f demand 
artefacts. Thus even if  they are not told what the experiment is trying to prove 
or disprove participants may well attempt to aid (or even disable) the 
researcher by guessing the intention o f the research and responding to the 
research rather than to the independent variables.
Again as with most forms o f research the degree o f validity o f the findings 
may be questioned. This can easily be divided into two distinct areas, internal 
and external. With regard to internal validity the question that must be 
answered is whether or not the results from the experiment are relatable to the 
experiment itself. It would be a problem if no causal link could be established 
at the experimental level. However as Malhotra (1996, p. 255) notes, ‘a 
laboratory experiment also tends to produce the same results if  repeated with 
similar subjects, leading to a high internal validity.’ O f course even if high 
internal validity is obtained this will not necessarily translate into an equal 
level o f high external validity - in other words we may not be able to 
generalise our findings into the real world with much confidence. O f course 
the key to equating the two is to set the parameters o f  the model as close to the 
real world situation as is possible.
However when all is said and done the laboratory experiment is taken 
seriously by social scientists (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996). Green 
and Shapiro (1994, 121) who are generally extremely critical o f the rational-
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choice approach to understanding politics even have a few good words for the 
simulation method noting that
the experimental literature on legislative voting contains 
some o f the most imaginative and thought-provoking 
empirical work to emerge from rational-choice theory, and a 
dismissive critique fails to do justice to the potential 
contribution o f this line o f research.
S U M M A R Y
W e have outlined a simulation that can be played in an attempt to provide a 
better understanding o f the behaviour o f parliamentarians in the legislative 
voting arena. The key parameters o f the game sought to represent the real 
world situation faced by real parliamentarians. The essence o f the exercise was 
to demonstrate the mix o f cooperation and conflict that lies at the heart o f the 
decision faced by politicians in deciding to act collectively or to act 
independently. The chapter proceeded to formalising the game and preparing it 
for play by others. Having played the game it is hoped that participants and 
observers would have a better understanding of the nature and workings of 
party discipline at a micro level. Below the game instructions are reproduced 
for use by others.
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T H E  G A M E
This is a game for between ten and 200 players. It should last for between one 
and two hours.
Essentially the game is played in rounds and each political party attempts to 
ensure that all its members vote in a cohesive manner while attempting to win 
support from members o f other parties. Each political party is composed of 
two or more people, the more the better.
WARM UP EXERCISE
Parties are formed before the actual simulation commences. The number of 
parties will vary with the number of players. W e recommend that on first play 
only two parties be formed and individuals be assigned to a party on the basis 
o f their answers to the following questions:
Q 1: Do you agree that taxes should be high in order to pay for social welfare.
Q2: Do you agree that the media should be controlled in what they attempt to 
write about so as to protect the private lives o f famous people.
Q3 : Do you agree that we should enter any future European military alliance.
1 5 7
The Game Overall Director (G O D.) should assign membership o f parties 
based on congruence o f opinion on questions. I f  question one provides an 
equal division then the remaining questions can be dispensed with.
PLAYING THE GAME
At the beginning of the game all members o f the same party meet and elect a 
leader. The leader is responsible for ensuring cohesive voting. Each party is 
then provided with an envelope which contains a list o f motions. The party 
will also be told how it is expected to vote.
G.O.D. assigns an equal amount o f money to each of the parties. This money 
is to be spent at the discretion o f the party leader in attempting to bribe 
members o f the other parties to rebel against their own party position.
Round one commences with each party leader attempting to muster support 
from his or her own party. At the same time his or her representatives will be 
secretly attempting to do deals with members o f the other party. At each 
subsequent round the party leaders receive £50.
Before each vote the two parties are required to place £ 50 in the kitty. 
W hichever party wins the vote will win the amount in the kitty. Should a tie 
occur in the voting the kitty is forfeit and returned to the bank.
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The leader can decide to expel any member at any time although an expelled 
member can call for a vote o f confidence in the leader, which, if he or she 
looses means they must retire from the game.
The game stops at a time decided by G O D  and unknown to any of the 
players. At the end any money retained in the party funds is distributed equally 
to all members o f the party.
HOW TO WIN
The winner is the person with the most money at the end.
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